The Development and the Side Effects of Remittances in the CIS Countries: The case of Ukraine by KUPETS, Olga
CariM-east  –  Creating an observatory 
of Migration east of eUroPe
Co-financed by the European Union
The Development and the Side Effects of Remittances 
in the CIS Countries: the Case of Ukraine
Olga Kupets
CARIM-East Research Report 2012/02
© 2012. All rights reserved.
No part of this paper may be distributed, quoted 
or reproduced in any form without permission 
from the CARIM-East Project.
CARIM-East 
Creating an Observatory of Migration East of Europe 
 
 
 
Research Report 
CARIM-East RR2012/02 
The Development and the Side Effects  
of Remittances in the CIS Countries: 
the Case of Ukraine  
Olga Kupets 
Economics Department, National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2012, European University Institute 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
 
This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Any additional reproduction for 
other purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the Robert Schuman 
Centre for Advanced Studies. 
Requests should be addressed to carim.east@eui.eu 
If cited or quoted, reference should be made as follows: 
 
[Full name of the author(s)], [title], CARIM-East RR [series number], Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, [year of publication]. 
 
THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS PUBLICATION CANNOT IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES BE REGARDED AS THE 
OFFICIAL POSITION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
 
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
http://www.carim-east.eu/publications/ 
http://cadmus.eui.eu 
 
  
CARIM-East – Creating an Observatory East of Europe 
This project which is co-financed by the European Union is the first migration observatory focused on
the Eastern Neighbourhood of the European Union and covers all countries of the Eastern Partnership
initiative (Belarus, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) and Russian
Federation.  
The project’s two main themes are: 
(1) migration from the region to the European Union (EU) focusing in particular on countries of
emigration and transit on the EU’s eastern border; and 
(2) intraregional migration in the post-Soviet space. 
The project started on 1 April 2011 as a joint initiative of the European University Institute (EUI),
Florence, Italy (the lead institution), and the Centre of Migration Research (CMR) at the University of
Warsaw, Poland (the partner institution).  
CARIM researchers undertake comprehensive and policy-oriented analyses of very diverse aspects of
human mobility and related labour market developments east of the EU and discuss their likely
impacts on the fast evolving socio-economic fabric of the six Eastern Partners and Russia, as well as
that of the European Union. 
In particular, CARIM-East: 
 builds a broad network of national experts from the region representing all principal
disciplines focused on human migration, labour mobility and national development issues (e.g.
demography, law, economics, sociology, political science).  
 develops a comprehensive database to monitor migration stocks and flows in the region,
relevant legislative developments and national policy initiatives; 
 undertakes, jointly with researchers from the region, systematic and ad hoc studies of
emerging migration issues at regional and national levels.  
 provides opportunities for scholars from the region to participate in workshops organized by
the EUI and CMR, including academic exchange opportunities for PhD candidates; 
 provides forums for national and international experts to interact with policymakers and other
stakeholders in the countries concerned. 
Results of the above activities are made available for public consultation through the website of the
project: http://www.carim-east.eu/ 
For more information: 
CARIM-East  
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (EUI) 
Convento 
Via delle Fontanelle 19 
50014 San Domenico di Fiesole 
Italy 
Tel: +39 055 46 85 817 
Fax: + 39 055 46 85 770 
Email: carim.east@eui.eu   
 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/ 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Remittances flowing from Ukrainian migrants working in high-income countries to Ukraine are an 
increasingly important source of extra income for migrants’ families. Given the increasing size of 
aggregate remittance inflows, they are also expected to be a potential source of funding for the social 
and economic development of Ukraine as a whole. If remittances enhance investment in physical and 
human capital and thus boost productivity, they can help mitigate the possible negative economic 
effects of rapid population decline and the aging of the Ukrainian population. Yet the potential 
benefits of remittances are likely to be matched by potential costs. Thus, two main issues are of 
interest with regard to remittances in Ukraine: 
 what are their benefits and costs for migrants’ families, local communities, the Ukrainian 
economy and society; and 
 how to harness their development potential while limiting any counterproductive side effects. 
This paper directly addresses these two questions. It does so by reporting first results from an 
ongoing effort to assess the potential development and unwanted side effects of remittances in 
Ukraine. These results come from a survey of the empirical literature in Ukraine and other transition 
economies and are supported, where possible, by the author’s contributions. The purpose of this work 
is to draw out evidence-based policy implications. 
Given that data on migration and remittances in Ukraine is incomplete and unreliable, we make use 
of all existing data sources on private transfers sent to Ukrainian households: data quality is 
consistently poor, but, we assume that it has similar biases over time. And we focus our analysis on 
relative changes in remittance inflows over time rather than on their absolute magnitude. 
What are the Main Characteristics of Remittance Flows? 
 Personal remittance inflows to Ukraine were estimated by the National Bank of Ukraine 
(NBU) at about US$ 5,862 bln. in 2010, or 4.2% of GDP. Alternative expert estimates, some 
of which lack hard data, vary from US$ 1.7 bln. to 54 bln.; 
 the share of the net compensation of employees increased from 37.4% in 2007 to 57% in 
January-September 2011, whereas the second component of personal remittances – personal 
transfers – lost its relative importance; 
 although bank accounts remain the major transmission channel for personal remittances to 
Ukraine, since 2007 they have been losing ground to international money transfers that 
accounted for about 40% of all transfers from January to September 2011; 
 Russia, the US, Germany, Greece and Cyprus are the top five source countries of officially 
registered personal remittances to Ukraine. Whereas important destination countries for 
Ukrainian labour migrants such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are either at the 
bottom of the  NBU list of countries or missing altogether. This may be explained, in part, by 
the informal nature of most transfers between migrants and their households in these countries. 
There is also the question though of the relatively small scale of total remittances transferred 
from this region compared to other countries. In these other countries cross-border transfers 
are not always related to migration, but rather to the minimization of income tax liability in 
off-shore zones; 
 total remittance inflows to Ukraine are very responsive to changes in inflows from Russia that 
point to the heavy dependence of the Ukrainian economy on Russia. This is true not only in 
terms of international trade and finance channels but also in terms of remittances; 
 over half of all remittance-receiving households in Ukraine are concentrated in western  
Ukraine. Densely populated and industrially developed eastern regions that have a common 
border with Russia, make up less than 20% of all recipient households (as of 2007). Most 
 remittance-receiving households belong to the middle and lower middle class (subjectively 
judged) and are to be found in urban areas, but not in the capital city; 
 Ukrainians working relatively close to their region of origin and frequently visiting their 
household members are more likely to bring part of their earnings when they come back to 
Ukraine rather than sending money from abroad; 
 female, unmarried, young, highly-skilled individuals whose families live in urban areas have a 
lower propensity to remit than their counterparts (based on a univariate analysis); 
 labour migrants use a wide array of formal and informal mechanisms to remit money, ranging 
from electronic transfers through banks, money transfer companies and post offices to hand 
deliveries by the migrants themselves, friends/ relatives or by a third party (couriers, bus 
drivers and train stewards). The relative importance of theses differs from country to country. 
The proportion of remittances sent to Ukraine through informal channels is estimated at from 
15% to 200% of reported remittances. 
How are the remittances used? 
 Overall, remittances received from Ukrainian migrants are predominantly spent on essential 
consumption needs, the purchase of durable goods, improving housing conditions (either via 
purchase or the repair of a house/flat), education, and, less often, on repayment of debt, 
accumulation of savings, and medical treatment. Very few of the remittances received by 
households is channelled into business investment. We expect that investments in productive 
capital by household members and return migrants may increase only after the households’ 
more-pressing consumption needs are satisfied and the Ukrainian business and investment 
environment has significantly improved; 
 there are significant differences in the use of remittances depending on the age and gender of 
migrants and their household type (urban/rural). In the trade-off between current and future 
consumption young migrants and their household members tend to discount future earnings, 
preferring current over future utility. Unlike older migrants who can be eligible for publicly-
provided pension provisions and other insurance-based payments, many young migrant 
workers are not insured by the state against future adverse conditions. At present, they tend to 
“free ride” at the expense of local taxpayers, putting an additional strain on public finances. 
What are the positive effects of remittances? 
 Personal remittances are found to be pro-cyclical because of the economic crisis in the main 
source countries of remittances to Ukraine (particularly Russia and the EU). They reacted, 
however, less violently to the economic downturn in Ukraine than profit-driven private capital 
flows. Furthermore, due to the substantial depreciation of the hryvnia against the US dollar in 
the wake of the 2008-2009 crisis, remittances in the hryvnia and as a percent of GDP have 
actually increased during the crisis; 
 as a sizable and increasing element in the Ukraine’s balance of payments officially recorded 
personal remittances helped counteract depreciation pressure from a growing trade deficit, that 
considerably widened during 2005-2008, because of increasing prices in imported oil and gas, 
domestic demand growth exceeding output growth and eroding competitiveness. However, 
taking into account that remittances are an unsolicited, non-market, cross-border private 
transfers which often move through informal channels, their role as a source of foreign 
exchange should not be exaggerated; 
 remittance-induced demand for consumer goods and real estate contributed to the growth of 
such sectors as the retail trade, construction, transport, financial mediation and insurance, real 
estate and legal activities, household and personal services, the food industry, the 
manufacturing of furniture and construction materials, and thus this demand facilitated the 
restructuring of the Ukrainian economy; 
 despite the fact that remittances are mainly used for consumption, they proved to be a 
powerful driver of Ukraine’s GDP growth before 2006. However, they are less responsible for 
GDP growth than macro-economic stabilization and structural reforms, the recovery of output 
lost in the 1990s, in terms of trade gains and investment. Simulation results of the computable 
general equilibrium model reveal that the hypothetical Ukrainian economy in 2004 would 
have lost about 7.1% of potential GDP and private consumption would have contracted by 
18%, had the amount of remittances been reduced by 70%, had the domestic labour supply 
increased by 5% and had total factor productivity declined by 10%. But these outcomes are 
very sensitive to input parameters assumptions; 
 remittances have a considerable impact on financial development in Ukraine, at least through 
induced financial literacy among remittance-receiving households and the development of the 
formal financial system across the country. But their potential in expanding the supply of 
funds to the domestic banking system via saving accounts and, therefore, in fuelling growth 
through lending support to the SME sector is greatly underexploited due to low confidence in 
the banking system; 
 remittances have positive effects on the welfare of recipient households: augmenting their 
income, financing essential human and housing needs, improving access to education, health 
care and other under-provided public goods, easing liquidity constraints, and insuring 
households against income shocks. As remittances were initially in foreign currency, they 
helped cushion remittance-receiving households against household insolvency in the wake of 
the 2008 crisis; 
 remittances helped reduce poverty, particularly in backward areas that received the bulk of 
remittances. But strong economic growth in Ukraine in 2000-2008 and expansionary fiscal 
policy reflected in rapidly rising public-sector wages and social transfers since 2004 were the 
most important factors in reducing poverty; 
 income earned abroad which was invested in education contributed to an increase in enrolments 
in higher education and an increase in the share of privately financed students. How these 
changes will affect the quality of human capital and labour productivity, given over-education 
and the skills mismatch in the Ukrainian labour market, is still an open question. 
What are the negative effects of remittances? 
 Remittance inflows in foreign currency (US dollars, Euros and Russian roubles) were, in part, 
responsible for the growing dollarization – both official (foreign currency accounts and loans 
in the banking system) and unofficial (household cash savings in foreign currency) – of the 
Ukrainian economy before the 2008 crisis. High dollarization is a reason for concern because 
it limits the effectiveness of monetary policy. It intensifies the negative consequences of fiscal 
deficits, and magnifies the vulnerabilities in the banking system in the event of an economic 
crisis and currency depreciation. The recent banking crisis in Ukraine confirms our line of 
argument: the high proportion of long-term foreign currency loans coupled with the 
depreciation of the local currency triggered an increase in non-performing loans that resulted 
in severe liquidity constraints in the banking system. This, in turn, set off a pronounced and 
ongoing credit crunch that held back the rapid recovery of the Ukrainian economy; 
 remittances have played a decisive role in creating an inflationary spiral through their effect on 
household demand for consumer goods. Heavy remittance investment in real estate brought 
about a sudden increase in house prices in the remittance-receiving regions. As a result, active 
migrants have been forced to stay abroad longer to save more money than they had initially 
 planned, while households not having access to remittances have come under increased 
pressure to send family members abroad; 
 remittances combined with the long-term absence of family members have negative social 
externalities such as poor school performance and psychological disorders in those children 
left behind; erosion of emotional ties between family members; the redistribution of gender 
roles, and often family disintegration; and social stratification in local communities; 
 as the use of remittances for investment in higher education is often risky and unreasonable 
(moral hazard problem), it often adversely affects youth employability and contributes to a 
substantial skills mismatch in the Ukrainian economy. This, in turn, can have a long-lasting, 
adverse effects on human-capital formation in Ukraine, as it reduces the present stock of 
human capital through brain waste. But it also negatively affects the accumulation of human 
capital in the future by reducing private incentives to invest in education; 
 remittances pose a “public moral hazard” problem by reducing political will to undertake 
necessary reforms and in miring Ukraine in a policy trap, with rent-seeking behaviour, state 
capture, weak rule of law, widespread corruption and a poor investment climate at its core. 
Policy recommendations 
 Here at the outset, we see that the development effects of remittances in Ukraine are often 
contradictory and contingent upon many factors, and there is still much that we need to know 
about the impact of remittances on Ukraine.  
 There is the need to improve the data on remittances and to make it available to researchers, 
investors and other interested parties. Determining the scale of remittances is essential for 
making optimal policy decisions. 
 There is a need to go beyond short-term desk studies and to invest in longitudinal and in-depth 
research on various aspects of remittances. 
 The real challenge for policymakers is to design policies which harness the development 
potential of remittances, while limiting their counterproductive side effects. But primary 
efforts should be spent on breaking up the policy trap which is partly induced by growing 
remittance inflows. It would also prove wise to focus on: 
o encouraging remittance flows through formal channels; 
o introducing incentives for the productive investment of remittances and other incomes; 
o strengthening engagement in active policy debates on reducing legal barriers to labour 
mobility between Ukraine and EU countries and coordinating efforts in effective 
migration management, including such important issues as undocumented migration, 
cross-border human trafficking, the mutual recognition of professional qualifications, 
skills matching between migrant workers and jobs abroad, and the portability of 
pension, health, and other social benefits. 
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Introduction  
Over the two decades since Ukraine’s independence and its transition to a market economy, barriers to 
the cross-border movement of people have significantly fallen away. Like many other emerging 
economies with delayed and inconsistent transition reforms and relatively low incomes, Ukraine has 
experienced the emigration of many workers. These have responded to the lack of decent and 
productive employment opportunities at home and to the opportunities for working abroad. 
Remittances – the money that migrants send home from foreign economies to their households – 
have also increased rapidly, particularly over the last five years. According to World Bank data 
(Figure 1), remittance inflows to Ukraine increased by a factor of almost seven between 2006 and 
2010 (from US$ 829 million to US$ 5,607 million). This huge increase in remittances may, of course, 
reflect improvements in the central bank’s remittance recording system, rather than changes in 
migrants’ remittance behaviour. And data on remittances in the CIS region is generally criticized for 
the poor reliability of said information (Shelburne and Palacin, 2007). However, it is an undeniable 
fact that migrant remittances contribute to family welfare as an extra source of income, and a booster 
to higher living standards and human capital formation, particularly by improving access to education 
and health. Furthermore, remittances are an increasingly important external source of capital for the 
social and economic development of Ukraine. Unlike FDI and other capital flows these do not 
generate future repayment obligations and they are less likely to rapidly flow out of the country with 
economic turmoil. Productivity gains that might be achieved through the effective use of remittances 
in Ukraine can be a powerful force in addressing growth constraints caused by natural population 
decline, emigration and aging populations. 
Figure 1. Remittance flows to Ukraine (in mln. current US$, 1996-2010) 
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Source: World Development Indicators (based on IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook and data files). 
Note: Data here is the sum of three items defined in the fifth edition of the IMF's Balance of Payments Manual (BPM5): 
workers' remittances, compensation of employees, and migrants' transfers. 
Over the past years, partly because of the sharp, registered increase in remittance flows, a wide 
range of issues related to migration and remittances have become the subject of political debate in 
Ukraine. Although the migration process has been extensively studied by Ukrainian and international 
researchers, much less attention has been given over to remittances as a multi-faceted and complex 
phenomenon. Remittances, as the literature clearly shows, generally have a positive impact on key 
aspects of development, but remittances can also have negative side effects on the remittance-
receiving country. There is a lack of knowledge of the benefits of remittances in development and of 
the available policy options to maximise these benefits. There is also a lack of public goodwill towards 
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international migration. Both of these factors reduce the ability of Ukrainian policymakers to 
implement a coherent win-win strategy on labour migration and remittances. 
This paper seeks to help fill the existing knowledge gap in this area by undertaking a 
comprehensive study of the pros and cons of remittances in Ukraine in terms of negative side effects 
and development. Ukraine is the largest country among the Eastern partners and a country which has 
recently made the significant step of negotiating an EU Association Agreement (EC, 2011). It is also 
an attractive laboratory for the study of the migration-remittances-development nexus in the Eastern 
Partnership region. 
It is necessary to note, however, that despite the existence of several data sources on international 
migration and remittances in Ukraine, a rigorous evaluation of the micro- and macro-economic impact 
of remittances applying the most recent econometric techniques is problematic due to the limits 
inherent in transition economies: the statistical system on international migration is not sufficiently 
developed, long time-series for macro-economic variables are not generally available due to the 
relatively short period of Ukraine’s independence and ongoing changes in the methodology of 
collection and statistical data processing. Household surveys on migration issues are not, meanwhile, 
regularly conducted and they lack many important remittance-related variables. Nor are their results 
completely reliable due to sample-size problems. Given this, our study will draw extensively on the 
existing literature on remittances and their effects in Ukraine and in other transition economies with 
similar adjustment paths. 
The specific objectives of the paper are: 
 to ascertain the scale of remittances to Ukraine according to different sources and to describe 
the main characteristics of remittances, both at macro- and at micro-levels; 
 to present an extensive review of existing studies on various direct and negative side effects of 
remittances in CIS countries and in Ukraine in order to determine what is known and what 
should be done; 
 to offer policy options aimed at maximising the benefits of remittances and at reducing their 
negative side effects in Ukraine. 
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter 1 summarizes the potential benefits and costs of 
remittances for migrants’ families and their countries of origin based on the survey of the relevant 
economic literature, with a particular focus on transition economies in the CIS region. Chapter 2 
investigates the size of remittance flows to Ukraine, the main remittance sending countries, the use of 
formal and informal channels, and the profiles of remittance senders (migrants) and receivers (their 
families). Chapter 3 addresses the economic and other impacts of remittances in Ukraine. And Chapter 
4 discusses “a remittances policy trap” and summarizes the policy options for leveraging remittance 
use for development. 
Chapter I: Remittances and their Role in the Development of Transition Economies; 
Empirical Evidence in the CIS Region 
Widening interest in the development potential of remittance flows over the last decade has resulted in a 
mushrooming of the scientific literature, which has been extensively reviewed in several studies (see, 
e.g. Agunias, 2006; Chami et al., 2008; Ghosh, 2006; OECD, 2006; Rapoport and Docquer, 2006; World 
Bank, 2006). The overall tenor of these studies is that remittances benefit the economy. Indeed, these 
studies, describe the effect of remittances on migrant-sending countries as a relatively stable source of 
foreign exchange and income and as a safety net for the poor. However, it is also recognised that these 
positive effects can be somewhat neutralized. This is the case, for example, when remittances lead to: 
demand-pull inflation and income inequality; a real appreciation; or a delay in the depreciation of local 
currency – a variant of the so-called Dutch disease – that may hamper a country’s competitiveness and 
economic growth, and increase the vulnerability of remittance-dependent countries to sudden external 
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shocks. Furthermore, it is usually argued that remittances are not a panacea and that they cannot 
substitute sound economic policies and the structural reforms necessary for broad-based development in 
developing countries. Various channels transmitting the positive impact of remittances on development 
and their possible side effects are summarized in Table A.1 in the Annex. 
The migration and development challenges in the post-Soviet countries are different from those faced 
by developing countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, North Africa and Asia: studies in these 
particular countries are most often cited in the literature on remittances and development. This is so 
not least because the post-Soviet nations have witnessed a painful transition since 1991 together with a 
sudden increase in cross-border migration after the elimination of restrictions placed on the movement 
of people by the Soviet system. Hence, we focus our review of the empirical evidence on links 
between remittances and various economic and social indicators in remittance-receiving countries of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).1 Therefore, the sample of CIS countries used in the 
study excludes Russia and Kazakhstan which are net senders of remittances (Table 1). What is more, it 
omits Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan which do not provide balance of payments data consistent with 
the IMF methodological procedures. 
1.1. Remittances as a source of foreign exchange 
For many resource-poor countries in the region, such as Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, and Tajikistan, remittances are vital. Indeed, large inflows of remittances serve as a key 
source of foreign exchange for narrowing the substantial current account deficit of these nations 
(Mansoor and Quillin, 2006; EBRD, 2004-2008). In fact, a substantial increase in remittances before 
the global economic crisis helped cushion the adverse impact of increasing energy prices on current 
accounts (Iradian, 2007). 
Table 1. Remittances and current account balance in the CIS, 2010 (in millions of current $US)* 
Country 
name 
Workers' remittances and 
compensation of employees 
FDI, net 
inflows 
Net official 
development 
assistance and 
official aid, 
received* 
Net trade in 
goods and 
services 
Current 
account 
balance paid 
received 
mln. 
US$ 
% of 
GDP 
Armenia 156.6 995.8 10.7 570.1 527.6 -2,274.8 -1,373.2 
Azerbaijan 961.4 1,432.4 2.8 563.1 232.3 17,997.5 15,039.6 
Belarus 105.3 376.1 0.7 1,402.8 98.1 -7,425.6 -8,492.7 
Georgia 50.2 806.1 6.9 548.8 907.9 -2,038.1 -1,122.1 
Kazakhstan 3,021.0 290.6 0.2 9,961.0 297.9 21,828.4 4,319.0 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 296.7 1,275.4 27.6 233.6 314.7 -1,429.4 -188.0 
Moldova 116.7 1,369.9 23.6 194.3 245.1 -2,299.8 -522.9 
Russian 
Federation 18,795.5 5,263.7 0.4 42,868.4 – 122,484.2 70,599.0 
Tajikistan 855.8 2,254.5 40 15.8 408.9 -1,817.1 -382.8 
Ukraine 24.0 5,607.0 4.1 6,495.0 668.0 -3,850.0 -2,884.0 
Source: World Development Indicators, based on IMF balance of payments data. 
Note: * Net official development assistance and official aid refers to 2009. 
 
                                                     
1 The CIS is not used here to refer to the institutional arrangement. It is rather used to label the regional grouping of twelve 
former republics of the Soviet Union: not including though the Baltic states. 
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Remittance inflows add up at the national level, surpassing 10% of GDP in four countries (Table 
1). As such they represent far larger and far more stable sources of foreign exchange than other types 
of foreign exchange inflows: official development assistance, foreign investment and loans. 
Furthermore, remittances offer a relative advantage because they do not entail the creation of external 
debt with future repayment obligations. They are generally not tied to the variety of political and 
economic conditions with which the recipient country must comply (as in the case of official 
development assistance and conditional loans). And remittances are less volatile in the face of an 
economic downturn in the recipient country. On the other hand, remittances are private funds like 
other sources of household income. Therefore, they should not be viewed by the State as a substitute 
for official development assistance or direct foreign investment in addressing balance of payments 
issues and in driving economic development. This explains why the authorities in the CIS region, 
including Moldova (Marandici, 2008), focus their policies on attracting foreign investment rather than 
on taking advantage of migrants’ remittances. 
It is also evident in the literature on remittances and development (e.g. Ghosh, 2006; World Bank, 
2006; Mansoor and Quillin, 2006) that remittances, as a significant and relatively stable source of 
foreign exchange, can improve a country’s creditworthiness for external borrowing. With innovative 
financing mechanisms such as securitization of future remittance flows they can expand developing 
countries’ access to external finance at lower costs and longer maturities than borrowing on sovereign 
credit. But there are significant obstacles to using this mechanism in the CIS region, including: a great 
deal of uncertainty for remittance flows coming through the formal channel; high-fixed costs 
associated with securitization transactions; long lead times; and the absence of an appropriate legal 
infrastructure that would minimize risks of fraud and default on securitized debt. Moreover, extreme 
caution is needed when considering the securitization of remittances during today’s global financial 
crisis. According to the World Bank (2006), Kazakhstan is the only country in the CIS region which 
used the securitization of remittances in 2004 to raise the financing necessary for its infrastructure and 
development projects. 
Despite these potential benefits, however, large and sustained remittance flows have been perceived 
as posing macro-economic challenges for recipient countries, particularly when there is the danger of a 
remittances-led “Dutch disease”:  the appreciation in the equilibrium real exchange rate that would tend 
to undermine the international competitiveness of domestic production, particularly that of cost-sensitive 
tradables. The recent empirical evidence provided by Barajas et al. (2010), which is based on applying a 
panel cointegration analysis to annual data from 1980-2007 for a large set of countries, is worth 
exploring here. The data is consistent with an appreciation of the real equilibrium exchange rate in 
response to a sustained inflow in workers’ remittances in the sample of low- and lower-middle-income 
countries; which includes the CIS countries under investigation here. But the scale of this effect is small, 
between one and three hundredths of one percent, depending on the regression. Furthermore, for low- 
and lower-middle-income countries that are relatively closed (either in trade or in capital account terms) 
this effect is found to be larger and more robust to specification changes. On the other hand, for more 
open countries the effect tends to be smaller and much more uncertain. 
Symptoms of Dutch disease have been found in Moldova and Armenia (World Bank, 2011; 
Roberts and Banaian, 2004). Meanwhile, in Tajikistan – a country with remittances making up among 
the highest percentages of GDP in the world – the impact of remittances on the exchange rate is found 
to be ambiguous. Strong appreciation pressures that emerged in early 2004 are mainly attributed to 
inappropriate monetary policy rather than to substantial remittance inflows (Kireyev, 2006, p.11). 
There is another challenge related to remittances as a source of foreign exchange, which is 
particularly relevant to the CIS countries, but which is rarely mentioned in the general literature 
reviews. This problem is that large remittance inflows in US dollars or Euros contribute to the 
dollarization/euroisation of the receiving economies. In most CIS countries, foreign currency has been 
extensively used in both cash and deposit form. As Havrylyshyn and Beddies (2003) argue, this can be 
attributed, in part, to inertial lack of confidence in the local currencies: because of macro-economic 
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instability, high inflation, and the depreciation of the local currency in the 1990s. However, it can also 
be explained by a lack of instruments for portfolio diversification in underdeveloped financial markets. 
Of course, some level of dollarization may be good for transition economies, as this promotes the 
development of domestic financial markets and may mitigate foreign exchange rate risks for foreign 
investors. But high dollarization remains a matter of concern. After all, it limits the effectiveness of 
monetary policy, increases balance-sheet risks that result from currency mismatches in banks’ balance 
sheets. It also magnifies the vulnerabilities of the banking system in the event of an economic crisis 
and currency depreciation, particularly in the case of foreign-exchange lending to unhedged 
borrowers. Isakova (2010) has found that FSU countries with large inflows of remittances are among 
those with the highest levels of deposit dollarization, whereas deposit dollarization is positively 
correlated with loan dollarization. 
Finally, remittance-driven household consumption, mostly in imported goods, seems to have 
contributed to a marked rise in import demand in resource-poor CIS countries and persistent trade 
deficits in goods; though increasing imported oil and gas prices and credit boom were more important 
factors (EBRD, 2007-2009; Atamanov et al., 2009). The substantial trade deficits which were only 
partly counterbalanced by inflows of remittances and FDI, combined with high foreign currency debt 
and capital flight following the crisis-induced global recession at the end of 2008. Together they 
exerted a downward pressure on local currencies and triggered significant deterioration in the 
economic and financial situation in the region. 
1.2. Remittances and growth 
Large inflows of remittances fuelling domestic demand have frequently been mentioned as important 
drivers of strong economic growth in the CIS region 2001-2008. According to EBRD Transition 
reports in 2004–2008, remittances, through their direct impact on private consumption and investment 
in property, played a particularly important role in economic growth in many small countries of the 
region, namely in Armenia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, and Tajikistan. 
Iradian (2007) used the panel regression approach and analyzed an extended set of explanatory 
variables compared to previous empirical studies on the determinants of growth in transition 
economies. This included  the output recovery index, workers’ remittances, terms of trade, and the 
EBRD market reform index. In doing so he found that the remittances to GDP ratio was positively 
related to per capita real GDP growth and total factor productivity growth in the transition sample. For 
the CIS as a whole, remittances were estimated to have accounted for about 0.9 percentage points of 
the 5.2 percentage points predicted change in growth rates between 2001–2006 and 1996–2000. 
Whereas 2.6 percentage points are due to an improvement in macro-economic stabilization and 
reforms and 1.1 percentage points are due to investment (Table 6 in Iradian, 2007). In Moldova and 
Tajikistan remittances appear to be even more important than macro-economic stabilization/ reforms 
and investment in explaining growth changes between 2001–06 and 1996–2000. Whereas in the 
Kyrgyz Republic and in Ukraine they are as important as investment. The positive, albeit mild, impact 
of remittances on per capita GDP growth is also found in Mansoor and Quillin (2006) in a joint 
sample of developed and developing economies. 
There was another cross-country study of the determinants of growth in the eleven CIS countries 
(excluding Russia) in 1997-2008 (Alturki et al., 2009). This study found that, although remittances are 
important determinants of growth in the countries under investigation here, their effect significantly 
differs depending on the region of origin. Remittance growth variables indicate that a 10 percentage 
point increase in the real growth of remittances from Russia is associated with an 0.3 percentage point 
GDP growth increase in all CIS countries, and with an 0.4 percentage point increase in oil-importing 
CIS countries: i.e. all countries except for Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. At the same 
time, the real remittance growth rate from European countries does not have a strong and significant 
impact. Although the effect of remittances from European countries to the CIS as a percentage of GDP 
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is statistically significant, in one specification for oil-importing countries, it is about one-fifth of that 
for Russian remittances. The authors conclude that remittances from Russia are strongly associated 
with growth rates in CIS oil-importing countries, even more than the other two channels, namely trade 
and financial flows. Therefore, Russian growth shocks are associated with sizable effects on GDP 
growth in Belarus, Tajikistan, and to some extent in Georgia, and the Kyrgyz Republic. 
Thus, cross-border remittances were a powerful driver of growth in the CIS region before the 2008 
global economic and financial crisis. They increased, however, the vulnerability of dependent 
countries to external shocks by being one of the transmission channels of the recession from the source 
countries of remittances, particularly from Russia, Kazakhstan and the EU (EBRD, 2009 and 2010). 
Due to the worsening external environment and due also to a sharp contraction in remittances, real 
GDP growth decelerated sharply in the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan in 2009 and became negative 
in Armenia and Moldova. The economies of Ukraine and Georgia also contracted sharply in the wake 
of the global crisis. But their contraction was not directly linked to a decline in transfers from workers 
living abroad. 
These objective measures of the impact of the crisis associated with remittances are supported by 
households’ subjective assessment according to the EBRD Life in Transition Survey in 2010: a 
reduction in remittances has been the third main type of shock experienced by households in transition 
economies (reported by almost 15 percent of households), especially in countries with large numbers 
of migrant workers abroad. This, in turn, had a statistically significant and sizeable effect on both 
overall and base consumption response indices (EBRD, 2011a and 2011b).2 Early indications in 2010-
2011 show that, after the Russian and Kazakh economies had returned to growth in 2010, remittances 
to Armenia, Moldova, the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan picked up and helped the economies 
bounce back (EBRD, 2010-2011a; World Bank, 2011). 
Our analysis presented in this section shows that although remittances have been instrumental in 
improving the short-run economic performance of many countries in the region, remittance-led growth 
in smaller economies has been found to be fragile and difficult to sustain. This supports the findings of 
the studies from other developing countries where over-reliance on remittance inflows increases 
domestic business cycle volatility and threatens to weaken the economy’s long-term growth potential 
(Chami et al., 2008). Since growth models based on remittances such as windfall gains may not be 
sustainable in the medium to long term, it is necessary to identify and develop other engines of 
economic growth. One example of this might be more diversified exports of goods and services: in 
Moldova as suggested by the World Bank ( 2011). After finding no strong evidence that remittances 
contributed to economic growth in the emerging economies, Barajas et al. (2009) suggested that 
policymakers reconsider their optimistic views of remittances and think carefully about institutions 
that can help remittance recipients turn into entrepreneurs and channel their transfers to investment. 
Similarly, Calderón et al. (2008) suggest taking complementary policy actions in four major areas 
namely education, institutions, the financial sector, and macro-economic distortions to enhance the 
growth impact of remittances. 
1.3. Remittances, investment and financial development 
According to the literature on the relations between remittances, investment and growth, remittance 
inflows may positively affect economic growth in the receiving economy through their effects on the 
growth of the economy’s technological capacity. Inflows may also positively affect growth through its 
effects on the rate of capital accumulation (i.e., the level of domestic investment), and on the efficiency 
                                                     
2 The “overall response” index includes the impact on all consumption categories, as well as stress responses such as loan 
defaulting, selling an asset, and relocating. “Base consumption” response index looks only at the reduction of basic goods 
and services consumption, including essential services such as medical care, but excluding luxury goods, car use, 
vacations or training (EBRD, 2011a). 
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of the allocation of new capital (Barajas et al., 2009; Chami et al., 2008). In other words, remittances can 
contribute to economic growth through investment growth. But much depends here on the remittance 
behaviour of migrants and the way in which remittance inflows are actually used. Various studies from 
the CIS region3 show that most remittances are spent by households on food and basic subsistence needs, 
better housing and sometimes better education for children. Only small amounts are spent on business 
investment or saved in bank accounts: this is, in part, due to a poor investment climate, absence of 
suitable investment opportunities and a lack of familiarity with investment instruments in the corporate 
sector. Remittances are, therefore, used for short-term coping strategies by households with the social 
consequences of the protracted transition process. They tend not to be used for laying down foundations 
for long-term prosperity via the efficient use of current transfers. 
The propensity of remittance-receiving households to save is found to be closely related to the 
stability of remittance flows and therefore to the type of migration (short-term vs. long-term vs. 
permanent) and the type of relations with those who send remittances. For example, a study of 
remittances in Armenia (Roberts and Banaian, 2004) distinguishes between remittances from 
temporary workers, savings brought back by temporary workers, remittances from emigrants (“new” 
diasporans), savings brought back by returning emigrants, and remittances from “old” diaspora 
relatives. This study argues that regular remittances are more likely to be consumed and, therefore, 
that they are less likely to be saved and invested than savings brought back by returning migrants. 
Nevertheless, there is indirect evidence that in countries with an underdeveloped financial system 
and high-interest rates remittances help alleviate a lack of credit and also that they compensate for 
inefficiencies in financial markets. In this light, an EBRD survey of 1,272 micro, small and medium-
sized enterprises in the trade and manufacturing sectors in four countries – Bulgaria, Georgia, Russia 
and Ukraine – conducted in 2005 is particularly interesting. This survey showed that loans from family 
and friends (supposedly with the bulk financed by remittances from abroad) were the second important 
financing source – after internal funds and retained earnings – for the working capital and fixed assets 
of small firms that did not have access to bank loans (EBRD, 2006). 
Furthermore, growing evidence shows that remittances help strengthen the banking system and 
stimulate financial development, something which is particularly important for transition economies 
(Brown et al., 2011; Kireyev, 2006). In particular, remittances promote the financial literacy of the 
population by bringing more people into contact with the formal financial system and by fostering 
competition and innovation among banks, money-transfer operators and other financial institutions. 
Although only a small proportion of remittances are usually saved in bank accounts due to a lack of 
confidence in the formal banking sector and a high propensity to consume, even these amounts seem 
to have helped to improve access to credit by SMEs. 
1.4. Remittances and employment 
There is no doubt that spending remittances on investment in physical capital and entrepreneurial 
activity has a direct positive effect not only on growth, but also on employment. Often a substantial 
portion of remittance receipts is used for consumption purposes and not saved or invested. But, even in 
these cases, remittances generate positive multiplier effects stimulating the development of a retail 
trade, transport, construction, the manufacturing of consumer goods and various services. This, in turn, 
should stimulate job creation and the further reallocation of labor from the military and heavy 
industrial sector inherited from the Soviet Union to the modern service sector and the production of 
consumer goods. 
                                                     
3 See e.g. Mansoor and Quillin (2006) based on a World Bank survey of returned migrants in Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, 
and Tajikistan; Hristev et al. (2009) based on CASE Rural Migration Survey in Moldova; ETF (2007) based on ETF 
survey of return migrants in Moldova; and Clement (2011) based on Living Standards Measurement Survey in Tajikistan. 
The spending behaviour of Ukrainian remittance-receiving households will be analysed later. 
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Available data on the changes in employment composition by sectors and employment to 
population ratio in the CIS region during the 2000s (Table 2) shows that most countries in the region 
experienced the anticipated reallocation of workers from agriculture and industry to services along 
with increases in the employment to population ratio. Georgia and Tajikistan moved, though, in the 
opposite direction. Even if Armenia and Azerbaijan are becoming more service-oriented they are 
doing so at a very slow rate. Moldova faced a sharp decline in its employment to population ratio. 
Therefore, remittances, which account for over 10% of GDP in Armenia and for 40% of GDP in 
Tajikistan, do not bring a significant impulse for the development of modern service industries and the 
creation of jobs. The reasons for this phenomenon need to be further investigated. 
Table 2. Employment by sectors and the employment to population ratio  
in the remittance-receiving CIS countries 
Country Year* 
Share of total employment (%) in: Employment to 
population ratio 
(15+, %) agriculture  industry services 
Armenia 2002 45.3 17 37.8 45.3 
 2008 44.2 16.8 39 46.9 
Azerbaijan 2000 41 10.9 48.1 59.4 
 2008 38.4 12.7 48.9 59.5 
Georgia 2000 52.1 9.8 37.9 56.8 
 2007 53.4 10.4 36 55.2 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
2000 53.1 10.5 36.5 60 
2008 34 20.6 45.3 62 
Moldova 2000 50.9 13.9 35.2 54.3 
 2008 31.1 19.7 49.2 47.2 
Tajikistan 1997 46.2 17.4 29.1 46.7 
 2004 55.5 17.9 26.2 55.2 
Ukraine 2000 23.4 20.8 55.8 51 
 2009 15.8 23.4 60.7 54.3 
Source: World Development Indicators 
Note: Data on the employment structure in Belarus is not available. *The first entry (the year 2000 by default) is replaced by 
the earliest possible year with complete information on employment structure. The second entry refers to the most recent year 
available in the WDI database. 
On the other hand, remittances may adversely affect aggregate labour supply and employment if 
remittance recipients rationally substitute unearned remittance income for labor income and, 
therefore, reduce labour effort: the “moral hazard” problem at micro-level. The household-level data 
for Moldova gives only weak support for this hypothesis but the remittance effect on the economic 
activity of those household members left behind appears to change non-monotonically with the size 
of remittances: “adults from households obtaining small or average remittances tend to be employed 
less frequently than members of households not receiving any funds from abroad. Then the 
relationship reverses and the employment rate for groups receiving high and very high remittances 
is as high as in non-receiving households. This change of relationship’s direction may be related to 
the fact that households obtaining large remittances tend to be on average more educated and 
younger” (Hristev et al., 2009). 
Remittances can also contribute to employment reduction on the labour demand side if remittance 
inflows induce the consumption of more imported goods and fewer domestic goods. Another 
alternative – the remittance-induced transition of local producers to more capital-intensive 
technologies – is very unlikely in the CIS region, given the spending pattern of remittances by 
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receiving households. Comprehensive analysis of the impact of remittances on the domestic labour 
markets in the CIS region is an important research task ahead: at present, though, we lack the 
necessary studies. 
1.5. Remittances and inflation 
Remittances can also adversely affect domestic prices, particularly in sectors where there is higher 
investment among receiving households. There is evidence in some CIS countries that remittances 
have contributed, at least partly, to inflationary pressures in the non-tradable sector, significantly 
affecting land and house prices and private sector wages (EBRD, 2007; Kireyev, 2006; World Bank, 
2011). Analysing determinants of house prices in the FSU countries (except for Kyrgyzstan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) during 1994-2009, Stepanyan et al. (2010) found that remittances and 
foreign inflows (defined by the authors as domestic banks’ investment liabilities other than FDI) were 
significant drivers of house prices in the region. Their estimates for two separate subsamples of 
countries suggest that foreign inflows play a significant role in the Baltic countries, Kazakhstan, 
Russia, and Ukraine, while remittances are an important determinant in smaller and poorer countries. 
These findings are open to criticism. The authors try to associate changes in average house prices in 
capital cities (in eight out of the twelve observed countries) with remittances. It is well established 
though that remittances most often go to rural and underdeveloped urban areas rather than  capital 
cities and their hinterlands.4 
Increasing house prices, predominantly in cities and coastal areas, have fuelled expectations about 
future prices and potential capital gains, leading to increased speculation in the house market (EBRD, 
2007). Sky-rocketing prices, in turn, have made housing less affordable to many poor households who 
wished to improve their housing conditions and who forced active migrants from such households to 
stay abroad longer and thus to save more money than they had initially planned. 
1.6. Remittances and human capital formation 
Taking into account the potential forward linkage between remittances and human capital (when 
remittances finance the education and the health needs of the next generation), there are a growing 
number of studies on the impact of migration and remittances on the education and health-care of 
children left behind in Central Asian countries (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) and Moldova. However, 
the results of these surveys are rather mixed. 
Nakamuro (2010), employing a micro-econometric analysis in Tajikistan and Albania, found strong 
positive effects of remittances on schooling attendance: all things being equal, children in an average 
remittance-receiving household are more likely to attend school than their counterparts from 
households that do not receive remittances. 
On the other hand, Brown et al. (2008) showed that school absenteeism in Tajikistan increased in 
remittance-receiving households and concluded that, given the limited demand for highly-skilled 
migrants from Tajikistan, most Tajik households did not invest in education if they were not sure that 
there would be a positive return. Anderson and Mirkasimov (2010) found that migration and 
remittances in Tajikistan have no impact on pre-school and secondary school enrolment or, indeed, on 
improvement in the health of young children. They do though have, their results suggested, positive 
effects on older children (18-23) in migrant households or remittance receiving households. These 
children are more likely to complete secondary school and so to enrol in higher education and are less 
likely to suffer from poor health. Their analysis also shows that overall expenditure on education per 
child increases in migrant households (more on books, food, and school premises and less on gifts to 
                                                     
4 According to Mansoor and Quillin (2006, Figure 2.8), the share of remittances going to households living in the capital city 
is less than 15% in Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic and slightly above 25% in more urbanized Georgia and Armenia. 
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teachers and fees) and that educational effects are significant only for boys, whereas health effects are 
similar for boys and girls. Kroeger and Anderson (2011) found similar gender differences in the Kyrgyz 
Republic. Young girls there suffer with respect to educational and nutritional outcomes: household 
resources are reallocated from girls to boys when male migrants remit because investment in the human 
capital of female family members is often regarded as less important than investment in boys. 
Hristev et al. (2009) found that Moldovan rural households receiving remittances are likely to 
spend more on education and health than households without remittances. But the total share spent by 
them on health, education and culture is smaller than the share spent on clothing, regardless of the size 
of the average monthly remittance inflow. This finding supports the hypothesis about conspicuous 
consumption, with excessive expenditure on foreign luxury products and sophisticated home 
appliances to show off newly-found wealth. This is something that creates a new division between 
migrant and non-migrant households in local communities and that sharpens social stratification 
(Ghosh, 2006). 
1.7. Remittances, poverty and income inequality 
Labour migration provides a “way out” from declining employment opportunities on the home labour 
markets and decreasing household incomes. Remittances sent by labour migrants in the CIS region, 
meanwhile, have acted as a form of social insurance helping family members finance the purchase of 
life’s necessities and pulling many of them out of poverty. For example, it is estimated that the 
presence of a migrant increases the household expenditure of a poor Moldovan household by up to 40 
percent. And remittances seem to be even more effective in reducing poverty than the government’s 
social protection programs which are mostly untargeted (World Bank, 2011). 
Migration and remittances have offered a lifeline out of poverty for many families in the CIS 
countries. However, empirical evidence based on household-level data suggests that relatively better-
off households were more likely to receive remittances from abroad than the most vulnerable and 
needy members of society: see Uzagalieva and Menezes (2009) in Georgia; World Bank (2011) for 
Moldova; and Mansoor and Quillin (2006) for Armenia, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan. 
There are several explanations for this phenomenon suggested in the literature on transition economies 
(Mansoor and Quillin, 2006). First, migration costs, including transportation, visa and work-permit 
fees, and living expenditures abroad, may be extremely high relative to household income. Second, 
members of households with higher incomes have, typically, higher education levels and so better 
access to information. Thus, migrants generally come from households with higher incomes, at least in 
the initial stage of migration. Third, households which have better opportunities to move may initially 
also pass on the knowledge and networks they obtain to households that interact with them (the social 
network effect). Finally, since remittances themselves have an impact on household income, some 
remittance-receiving households are likely to move up to higher percentiles of income distribution. 
Hence, remittances from migrant workers benefit households whose members take up the challenge 
of working abroad and who have the ability to migrate. In this respect the potential impact of 
remittances on inter-household income inequality in transition economies is similar to the impact of 
entrepreneurial income that benefit individuals who had better access to assets, including knowledge, 
information and start-up capital, and who took advantage and risks of the entrepreneurial opportunities 
offered by the transition to a market economy.  
Experts working in the CIS region intuitively argue that remittances exacerbate income inequality 
and contribute to rural-urban income disparity. But there is little empirical evidence on this issue 
because of poor data quality5 and difficulty in discriminating between the effects of remittances and 
                                                     
5 See Table A.2 in the Annex for indicators of income inequality, poverty and remittances in the selected CIS countries in 
2001-2010. 
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other income sources on income inequality in the region.6 Beyond inconclusive results, it is often 
questioned whether the link between remittances and inequality is all that important as long as 
remittances through direct and indirect (multiplier) effects contribute to an increase in average income 
in the country. Now some degree of inequality allows markets to work effectively. And so the 
existence of inequality can be seen as a natural characteristic of an efficient market-based economy 
and a democratic society. However, a high degree of inequality in poor countries may restrict 
economic growth (Barro, 2000). Even more important is the fact that in the CIS transition economies 
that have accomplished partial reforms, high-income inequality is closely linked to generalised 
dissatisfaction with the new economic and political system, which is perceived as unfair (Brainerd, 
2010). This, in turn, threatens political and economic stability, causes population resistance to 
necessary reforms in the successful completion of the transition to a market economy, and, therefore, 
leaves the countries trapped in a partial reform equilibrium.  
1.8. Remittances, public moral hazard, informalised welfare and policy trap 
Being one of the main drivers of domestic demand in smaller CIS countries, buoyant private foreign 
inflows from migrant workers have contributed to an increase in tax revenues, particularly from 
remittance-funded imports and growth in the non-tradable sector. These inflows have thus provided 
fiscal space to the governments. This, however, has posed a “public moral hazard” problem as these 
governments have no incentive to effectively use higher revenues from remittances. For example, 
governments choose not to invest in productivity enhancing infrastructure and new economic activities 
with higher growth potential. Nor do they maintain prudent fiscal policy or implement the structural 
reforms necessary for sustainable long-term growth and development. 
Furthermore, as the state fails to provide the social protection that the population implicitly 
demands, enterprises and individuals try to improvise solutions. Very often they make informal 
payments for what should be publicly-provided services, including education and health care. In such 
an “informalised welfare" model – typical of most CIS countries (Drahokoupil and Myant, 2009) – 
remittances constitute an important source of household income. They can be used for informal out-of-
pocket payments in the public sector in the form of bribes, gifts, and so-called charitable contributions 
that act as service fees. Remittances can too complement inadequate retirement benefits and welfare 
transfers, lifting people out of poverty. 
Jobless remittance-led growth and the poor quality of public goods and services, particularly in 
low-income CIS countries such as Moldova or Tajikistan, encourage more people to vote with their 
feet and to look for jobs abroad (World Bank, 2011; Kireyev, 2006). Remittances in turn fuel domestic 
demand, particularly for imported goods and construction. They also help cause a psychological 
downgrading of domestic goods, which is not likely to be counterbalanced by demand (if any) for 
these goods by the expanding diaspora abroad. In the absence of an adequate policy reaction, this 
reduces the international competitiveness of the tradable sector, limits export growth, business 
expansion, and job creation, creating a policy trap which is characterised by rent-seeking behaviour 
and state capture at the very centre. To break out of this policy trap and to maximize too the 
development gains from remittances and migration, governments should refuse the common practice 
of piecemeal actions to address some of the policy trap’s symptoms. Rather they must switch to a 
comprehensive and consistent policy capable of systematically tackling the underlying causes of these 
symptoms (World Bank, 2011). 
                                                     
6 According to the recent review of studies on wage and income inequality in Eastern Europe and the CIS (Brainerd, 2010), 
most of the increases in income inequality, particularly in the lower-income CIS countries, is primarily attributed to 
changes in the wage distribution as income in most countries is largely comprised of wages. 
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Chapter II: Scale and Characteristics of Remittances in Ukraine 
2.1. Statistical sources and definition of remittances in Ukraine 
The major source of official data on migrants' remittances in Ukraine, as in other countries, is the 
annual and quarterly balance of payments records of the National Bank: in this case the National Bank 
of Ukraine (NBU). These are published on-line7 and subsequently compiled in the IMF Balance of 
Payments Yearbook. 
As defined in the sixth edition of the IMF Balance of Payments and International Investment 
Position Manual (further BPM6; see Appendix 5 in IMF, 2009) and followed by the National Bank of 
Ukraine (NBU, 2011), personal remittances are derived from two items in the balance of payments 
framework:  
1.  net compensation of employees which includes the income of border, seasonal, and other 
short-term workers, who are employed in an economy where they are not resident, fewer taxes 
and expenses incurred in the economy of employment, and  
2. personal transfers which include all current transfers between resident and non-resident 
individuals, independent of the source of income of the sender and the relationship between 
the households. 
The distinction between personal transfers and the compensation of employees, when individuals 
go abroad for employment, is based on the length of stay and the residence status in a host country. 
Migrants going abroad to work for a year or longer thus become residents of the host economy and 
their remittances sent to households in another economy are recorded as “personal transfers.” 
Meanwhile, border, seasonal, and other short-term workers are not resident in the economy where they 
work and their gross income is recorded as “compensation of employees”(IMF, 2009, p.276). 
Although it is recognized that personal transfers often originate with migrants sending resources to 
support their relatives in their economy of origin, personal transfers as defined in BPM6 are not 
limited to such activities. Therefore, definitions of remittances based on balance of payments accounts 
are somewhat broader than those resulting from the movement of persons, because they are not based 
on the concepts of migration, employment, or family relationships. 
Personal transfers replaced an item called “workers’ remittances” in the standard presentation 
according to BPM5. But, nevertheless, workers’ remittances (i.e. current transfers made by employees 
to residents of another economy) and other personal transfers are continued as supplementary items in 
the statistics of the NBU and the IMF to ensure consistency in the time series. 
The NBU provides official statistics on personal remittances based on banking institutions' 
reporting of financial transactions with non-residents of Ukraine and on money transferred through 
money-transfer operators. The NBU has also provided, since 2007, an estimate of money transferred 
through informal channels (including family, friends, bus drivers who carry money across borders and 
unregulated money transfer firms). It is an expert estimate agreed with the technical mission of the 
IMF in 2008 and it is currently assumed at 15-16% of recorded remittance inflows. 
Finally, it is important to note, that, in addition to current transfers by migrants, some other resource 
inflows that migrant workers may make to their households and economies of origin are of analytical 
interest in the context of the economic effects of migration. These include investments by migrants 
abroad (financial investments, notably bank accounts and portfolio investment, as well as investments in 
real estate) and accumulated income brought by migrants returning home. However, these flows are not 
classified as remittances in the balance of payments framework. Therefore, data users who are interested 
                                                     
7 See http://www.bank.gov.ua/control/en/publish/category?cat_id=37804. 
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in understanding all contributions made by migrants should seek additional sources of information (e.g. 
household and individual surveys) to make appropriate additional estimations. 
No specific nationwide household remittance survey has been conducted in Ukraine. But results of 
household and individual surveys on migration issues can supplement official sources based on the 
balance of payment statistics providing important information on: who remits and who receives 
remittances; how much and through which channels; and how remittances are spent by receiving 
households. The only nationwide Modular Population Survey on Labour Migration Issues (with a 
combined sample of 22,099 households from the Labour Force Survey and the Household Budget 
Survey) was conducted in 2008. It was carried out by the State Statistics Service of Ukraine and the 
Ukrainian Centre for Social Reforms with financial and technical support from the Open Ukraine 
Foundation, the International Organization for Migration, and the World Bank. The second survey was 
conducted with the support of the European Training Foundation in 2007 and it was targeted at 
returning and potential migrants. It had, though, a significantly smaller sample than the above 
mentioned survey: 1,086 potential and 1,014 returning migrants. The main results of these surveys 
were published in, respectively, UCSR (2009) and ETF (2008). 
The ETF defines remittances as transfers of money by foreign workers to their home country, in 
our case Ukraine. The Modular Population Survey on Labour Migration Issues (further - Modular 
Migration Survey) which will be extensively used below provides two types of information about 
remittances: 
1) household-level data which refers to all transfers (in cash and in kind) from abroad that 
households received in 2007 and in January-April 2008 irrespective of the purpose of migration, 
family relationship and the channel used for transfer; 
2) individual-level data which refers to transfers of money from labour migrants of working age 
(i.e. women aged 15-54 years and men aged 15-59 years) to their households in 2007 and in January-
April 2008, irrespective of the channel used for money transfer.8 Questions in this section cover not 
only transfers of money to household members, but also other aspects of migrant experiences, 
including: the method of searching for a job; fees for services related to emigration; legal and 
employment status; the economic sector and occupation; and earnings and working conditions abroad. 
When giving information about transfers received from abroad, remittance-receiving households 
are asked to choose one of six boxes: up to US$/€ 1,000; US$/€ 1,001-2,000; US$/€ 2,001-3,000; 
US$/€ 3,001-4,000; US$/€ 4,001-5,000; and more than US$/€ 5,000. Given this limitation and the 
design of the survey, targeted predominantly at households with labour migrants of working age, data 
cannot be used for accurate estimates of remittances. 
Besides, the final sample of households and individuals provided to researchers covers only those 
respondents who gave any positive answer in the questionnaire of the Modular Migration Survey. In 
other words, it excludes a huge number of initially sampled households and individuals who could be 
used in the analysis of the migration and remittance behaviour as a non-migrant control group. 
Overall, the survey’s results must be interpreted with caution as the survey provides an impressionistic 
rather than a representative picture of migrants’ experiences (UCSR, 2009).  
2.2. The scale of remittances in Ukraine 
According to the most recent NBU data, personal remittance inflows to Ukraine amounted to US$ 
5,862 mln. in 2010 (or 4.2% of GDP) and to US$ 5,126 mln. in January-September 2011. Estimates of 
                                                     
8 Initial sample of households is defined as a nationally representative and random sample. Respondents answering the 
individual questionnaire are either labour migrants staying in Ukraine at the time of survey or household members who 
know migrants’ experiences best. 
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remittance inflows are, according to the World Bank, generally in line with NBU data but are 
somewhat lower (Table 3), probably because of differences in accounting methods. Before 2007 – 
when the NBU moved from the BPM5 to the BPM6 framework in collecting remittance statistics and 
introduced estimates of money transferred to Ukraine through informal channels – World Bank data 
coincided with NBU data (see Figure 1 above). 
Table 3. Remittance inflows to Ukraine based on balance-of-payment statistics, 2007-2011 Q3 
Measure Definition Source 2007 2008 2009 2010 
2011 
Q1 
2011 
Q2 
2011 
Q3 
Personal remittances (mln. US$)  
BPM6 NBU 
4,922 6,177 5,370 5,862 1,489 1,792 1,845 
Personal remittances (% of GDP) 3.4 3.4 4.6 4.2 4.5 4.5 4.0 
Workers' remittances and 
compensation of employees, 
received (mln. US$)  
BPM5 World Bank 4,503 5,769 5,073 5,607 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source: NBU (on-line reports on remittances); World Development Indicators. 
Annual remittance inflows increased by 9.2% in 2010, after they slumped by 13.1% as a result of  
the recession in the main destination countries for Ukrainian labour migrants (Russia, and the EU) in 
2009. Nevertheless, due to substantial depreciation in the local currency against the US dollar (over 
50%) and a 15% contraction in GDP in 2009, the role of remittances as a share of GDP actually 
increased during the crisis from 3.4% in 2008 to 4.6% in 2009, but then declined to 4.2% in 2010. As 
Figure 2 shows, remittances fell drastically in the wake of the crisis in 2009, but have been gradually 
recovering since 2010. 
Figure 2. Year-on-year change of quarterly remittance inflows into Ukraine,  
2009-2011 Q3 (percent change) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on NBU data.  
Note: The period covered is 2009-2011 Q3 because quarterly remittance statistics based on the new methodology have only 
been published since 2008. 
Official statistics on remittances are often blamed for underestimating the actual level of 
remittance flows. They are blamed because they fail to capture informal remittance transfers 
and even when funds are transferred through official channels such as bank accounts, the internet or 
phone cards. And the mechanisms for measuring these flows are, of course, weak. In order to better 
capture the extent of migrant remittances, independent think tanks and experts use different calculation 
methods and present their alternative estimates. The International Fund for Agricultural Development 
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(IFAD) estimated total remittances sent to Ukraine (2006) at US$ 8,471 mln. or 8% of GDP.9 
Assistant to the Vice Chairman of the NBU A. Gaidutski (2007a) employed indirect estimates of 
emigration from Ukraine (4.93 mln. people). He also made use of the monthly income of Moldovan 
emigrants depending on destination countries and migrants by the share of sent remittances in total 
income to arrive at an estimate for Ukrainian remittances.10 In this way, he came up with US$ 21,268 
mln., or one quarter of the country's GDP, for remittances sent by Ukrainians in 2006. Maidanik 
(2006) from the Institute of Demography and Social Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of 
Ukraine, using more sophisticated procedures estimated the total income earned by Ukrainians abroad 
at between US$2.1 bln. and US$11.6 bln., depending on hypotheses about the number of Ukrainian 
labour migrants (from 1 to 5 mln. people) and their educational profile. However, there is no 
information here about the amount of money sent back to Ukraine. Alternative estimates for 
remittance inflows to Ukraine vary from US$7-8 to 54 bln. depending on various experts and Diaspora 
representatives (Gaidutski, 2007b). These estimates depend on hypotheses about the number of 
Ukrainians abroad and the average monthly sums they send back home. Annual income and 
remittances sent back home by labour migrants in 2007 and estimated on the basis of the Modular 
Migration Survey are equal to respectively € 1.9 bln. and € 1.3 bln. (UCSR, 2009, p. 59-60). 
Finally, here is the most recent estimate of annual remittance inflows to Ukraine, given by the 
Vice-President of MoneyGram International in CIS, Eastern Europe and Israel, P. Hnatiuk at the IOM 
conference “The future of migration in Ukraine” held in Kiev 12 October 2011. Hnatiuk estimated 
remittance inflows at about US$ 25 bln. (5-6 mln. migrants send on average US$ 350-500, 6-8 times 
per year). The reliability of these estimates is open to question. 
The other way to estimate the size of remittances to the country is to use data on remittance 
outflows from the country’s main partners. This procedure requires that data be provided on a 
bilateral basis. But official remittance data is generally not provided on a bilateral basis, and this is 
typical for most economies (Shelburne and Palacin, 2007). According to the Second EU Survey on 
Workers’ Remittances from the EU to Third Countries (EC, 2006), Ukraine was sixth in the total 
ranking of third countries receiving remittances from the EU in 2004 and first among Eastern 
European countries. It received € 120.6 mln. in 2004, compared to about € 181 mln. in 2001-2002 
and € 144.9 mln. in 2003. Money came predominantly from Portugal, Latvia and Lithuania. In terms 
of comparison, in the same year NBU reported US$ 151.6 mln. received from selected EU countries 
(the most important in terms of remittance flows) as compensation for employees and US$ 117.6 
mln. in workers’ remittances. 
Shelburne and Palacin (2007) found similar inconsistencies in the estimates of bilateral remittance 
flows provided by the Russian Central Bank, the NBU and the World Bank. According to the NBU, 
remittance inflows from Russia in 2006 were US$ 67.2 mln., while the Russian authorities reported 
cross-border transfers to Ukraine through postal offices or money transfer companies of US$ 927 mln. 
for 2006 and total cross-border payments between physical persons of US$ 1,327 mln. in 2006QII-
2007QI. The World Bank reported total remittances from Russia to Ukraine of US$ 308.76 mln. 
Shelburne and Palacin (2007), meanwhile, estimated bilateral remittance flows through postal offices 
or money transfer companies from Russia to Ukraine in 2006 at US$ 1,538.8 mln. 
In view of the existing inconsistencies in remittance statistics, Shelburne and Palacin (2007) 
conclude that attempts to improve data on remittances need to be pursued using different methods. In 
particular, they suggest the better use of anonymous household and individual surveys. On 15-16 
March 2011, representatives of the NBU together with colleagues from the Central Banks of other CIS 
                                                     
9 See http://www.ifad.org/remittances/maps/europe.htm. 
10 Due to the absence of detailed migration and remittances statistics for Ukraine at that time, the author used Moldovan data 
assuming a close similarity between the earnings of Moldovan and Ukrainian migrants and their remittance-sending 
behavior. 
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countries and a representative from the Statistics Department of the IMF met in Russia (Tula City) to 
discuss the problem of remittance statistics for their countries. Participants in the meeting stressed the 
importance of qualitative household surveys to get an estimate of money transferred through informal 
channels. They also, though, stressed the need for the correct application of the guidelines and 
principles of remittance accounting in line with BPM6 (IMF, 2009) by all counterpart economies. This 
would, they hoped, ensure the consistency and comparability of bilateral data (NBU, 2011). 
2.3. Characteristics of remittances: components, channels and countries 
Analysis of the structure of personal remittances in Ukraine in 2007-2011 (Figure 3) shows that the 
share of net compensation for employees has increased over recent years and currently amounts to 
57%. This might be a sign of the changing nature of labour migration among Ukrainians in favour of 
short-term and seasonal migration (up to one year). The second component of personal remittances 
according to BPM6 – personal transfers, i.e. the sum of workers’ remittances and other personal 
transfers – accounted for 62.6% of total personal remittances in 2007, but then fell to 43% January-
September 2011. An interesting finding is that the scale and share of workers’ remittances has been 
decreasing since 2007. Other private transfers have, meanwhile, been changing non-monotonically. 
According to the NBU (2011), the former trend can be attributed not only to the global crisis, but also 
to the fact that increasing numbers of Ukrainian migrants stay abroad permanently and, therefore, they 
spend more on their lives there. 
Figure 3. Composition of annual personal remittance inflows into Ukraine by main components, 
2007-2011 (mln. US$) 
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Source: NBU. 
Bank accounts have traditionally been the major transmission channel for total remittances to 
Ukraine, but they have lost their significance from 57.3% of total remittances in 2007 to 46.9% in 
January-September 2011 (Figure 4). This is probably due to a loss of confidence in the banking system 
in the wake of the crisis. The international money transfer system, on the contrary, gained momentum 
and increased its share to 39.9%. Money transferred through informal channels is almost stable at 
about 13.2% in accordance with the predetermined NBU value (see Chapter 2.1 above). 
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Figure 4. Composition of personal remittance inflows to Ukraine by channels, 2007-2011 (%) 
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Source: NBU. 
However, the importance of bank accounts in transferring personal remittances from abroad is not 
uniform across the countries. As Figure 5 reveals, bank accounts are predominantly used in those 
countries with a developed financial system where most Ukrainian expatriates are highly-skilled and 
legal. The international money transfer system is extensively used in the main destination countries for 
lower-skilled labour migrants such as Russia, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Poland, and 
the Czech Republic. Perhaps these labour migrants do not have access to the banking system in the 
host countries because of their illegal status, language barrier, financial illiteracy and other reasons. Or 
perhaps they just prefer an international money transfer system: there is a rapidly developing regional 
network within said system, both in the host country and in Ukraine, in response to the growing needs 
of these labour migrants. The international money transfer system is also extensively used by 
expatriates (not labour migrants) living in Israel. 
Figure 5. Remittances through formal channels by major source countries  
and importance of bank accounts, January-September 2011 
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Source: NBU. 
Note: Data is based on bank statements on transactions with non-residents and the transfers performed using 
international money transfer systems, and does not include the amounts received through informal channels and 
money transfer systems created by residents of Ukraine. 
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As one might expect, Russia is the main source country of remittances for Ukraine accounting for 
32.1% of all remittance inflows in January-September 2011 (Table A.3 in the Annex). The other CIS 
country from which remittances come to Ukraine is Kazakhstan (1.1%). Fifteen EU countries account 
for 38.2%, and countries in other parts of the world (mainly, North America, Asia and Australia) make 
up the rest (23.2%). Strikingly, many countries mentioned in the NBU remittance statistics such as 
Cyprus (5.6%), Switzerland (2.2%), Singapore (1%), China (0.9%), Hong Kong (0.8%), Monaco 
(0.7%), and Panama (0.4%) are neither popular destination countries for temporary labour migrants 
from Ukraine, nor countries of residence for the old Ukrainian diaspora. This implies that personal 
remittances from these countries include transfers originating from individuals who are not migrant 
workers, presumably for the purposes of tax avoidance and money laundering. Some of these countries 
may also be staging posts rather than source countries for remittances. It is also possible that resident 
workers are employed by non-resident employers in Ukraine, but that their wages and other benefits 
are recorded as cross-border “compensation of employees” (IMF, 2009). At the same time, Hungary 
which is one of the five most popular destinations for labour emigrants from Ukraine (see Table A.4 in 
the Annex) is not mentioned among major countries in the NBU remittance statistics, most likely 
because of the informal nature of transfers between migrants and their households. For that reason, 
official statistics on remittance inflows should be used very carefully in conclusions about their effects 
on receiving households and the economy as a whole. 
There was a sharp decrease in personal remittances from Russia in 2009 (by 31.6% or US$ 578.4 
mln.) which accounted for 81% of the decline in remittances from all countries in the same year. Then 
there was the rapid recovery or remittances from Russia in 2010 almost to the pre-crisis level (by 29% 
or US$ 364.3 mln.). This demonstrates the heavy dependence of the Ukrainian economy on the 
Russian economy, not only in terms of the commonly-mentioned international trade and financial 
channels, but also in terms of remittances. According to Alturki et al. (2009), developments in Russia 
tend to spill over into Ukraine and other oil-importing CIS countries through these three channels, 
making domestic business cycles very volatile and long-term economic prospects uncertain. 
2.4. The microeconomics of remittances: profiles of receiving households and sending individuals 
2.4.1. Characteristics of households receiving remittances according to the Modular Migration Survey 
According to the Modular Migration Survey (household section), almost every second surveyed 
household received remittances, i.e. private transfers from abroad in cash or in kind, in 2007-2008 
(UCSR, 2009, p. 54). It is necessary to note, however, that the sample of surveyed households includes 
not all households initially selected for the survey (25,435 households) but only those households that 
gave any positive answer in the questionnaire of the Modular Migration Survey (2,459 households) 
(UCSR, 2009, p. 23). Therefore, information about households not receiving remittances which is 
presented below should be interpreted with caution. 
Remittance-receiving households were disproportionately represented in eight Western oblasts 
(Figure 6). This is attributable to the poor performance of this macro-region in terms of economic 
development and many economic-related components of human development (such as labour-market 
development, income, living conditions, education, and financing of human development) compared 
to the other Ukrainian macro-regions. It is also attributable to its geographical proximity to more 
advanced CEE and EU economies (Kupets, 2009). One in five remittance-receiving household is 
located in the industrially developed and relatively better-off east, a fact that can be explained by high 
population density and the proximity of the region to Russia. Kiev City stands out due to its 
exceptional performance in economic terms and in most aspects of human development (aside from 
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ecological and social environment).11 High living standards and attractive employment opportunities, 
a concentration of human capital and investment, high production and overall prosperity attract both 
internal and international migrants to the capital city. 
Figure 6. Ukrainian households receiving and not receiving remittances by macro-region  
(in % to total), 2007-2008 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on Modular Migration Survey household-level data (weighted with sample weights 
provided in the data set).  
Note: There are 27 administrative units (regions) in Ukraine: 24 oblasts, one Autonomous Republic (the Crimean AR), and 
two cities with a special status – Kiev and Sevastopol. These 27 regions are grouped into 5 geographical macro-regions as 
follows: West – Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi and Chernivtsi oblasts; East 
includes Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Luhansk and Kharkiv oblasts; Center and North –  Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, 
Kiev, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkasy and Chernihiv oblasts; and South – the Crimean AR and Sevastopol, Mykolayiv, 
Odessa and Kherson oblasts. 
As Table 4 shows, the bulk of remittance-receiving households belong to the middle and lower 
middle classes (according to their subjective status) and these are to be found in urban areas.12 
Interestingly, the share of households receiving transfers from their closest relatives (spouse, children, 
and parents) is much lower among urban households compared to their rural counterparts (64.8% vs. 
77.8%) and among poorer households compared to the wealthiest (69.6% vs. 91.4%). 
                                                     
11 According to the national methodology, regional human development is analyzed in nine main aspects: demographic 
development, labor market development, income, living conditions, education, health care, social environment, 
ecological environment, and the financing of human development (UNDP, 2008). 
12 Although poverty assessments in Ukraine (World Bank, 2005 and 2007a) found that poverty incidence in rural areas is 
more than twice that of large cities, rural households appear to be on average wealthier than their urban counterparts. This 
is the case at least according to their subjective answers in the Modular Migration Survey: the share of poor and very 
poor households is smaller among rural households (12% vs. 12.5% for urban households), whereas the share of 
households considering themselves as wealthy is larger (1.4% vs. 0.8% for urban households). 
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Table 4. Remittance-receiving households by source of transfer, place of residence and in terms 
of subjective status of household wealth, 2007 
 Total Urban Rural Wealthy Middle Lower middle 
Poor and 
very poor 
Number of households, 
receiving private transfers 
from abroad, thousand 
1,329.8 795.8 534 19.3 607.9 538.7 163.9 
Of them received from (%):        
Spouse 30.6 24.6 39.7 43.5 34.4 26.2 29.7 
Children 21.9 17.7 28.1 30.6 19.7 22.2 27.6 
Parents 17.5 22.5 10.0 17.3 18.1 18.4 12.3 
Relatives 25.5 30.1 18.5 8.3 22.5 29.2 26.3 
Friends or other persons 4.5 5.1 3.7 – 5.3 4.0 4.1 
Average money transfer 
received by one household 
during a year, US$ 
2,207 1,896 2,648 3,420 2,576 1,938 1,565 
Source: UCSR (2009), Tables 2.28-2.31. 
Out of 1,329,800 households receiving private transfers from abroad in cash or in kind, 1,144,300 
thousand reported receiving money transfers. According to the estimates of the UCSR, the average 
money transfer received per household in 2007 was about US$ 2,207,13 and it was 40% higher among 
rural households than among urban equivalents (Table 4). 
As expected, money transfers from abroad are an important income source for certain households, 
accounting for an average of 42.6% of household income in 2007; this based on the answers of 
households about the share of transfers in total household income. In particular, among households 
considering themselves wealthy, 65.2% reported that remittances accounted for over 50% of their 
household income. The similar indicators among poorer households varies from 36.6% in the “lower 
middle” group to 53.1% among the “poor and very poor” (UCSR, 2009). Unfortunately, these 
subjective answers, which depend on many factors, do not help us to assess the true impact of 
remittances on household well-being. 
2.4.2. Characteristics of labour migrants sending remittances according to the Modular Migration 
Survey and the ETF Survey 
According to the Modular Migration Survey (individual section), 61.1% of labour migrants which had 
experience of working abroad during the observed period (2007-June 2008), i.e. about 772,000 
individuals, sent remittances to other members of their household in Ukraine. But this does not imply 
that other migrants (39.9%) did not support their relatives at home (UCSR, 2009). The propensity to 
remit (measured as the share of migrants sending remittances among all labour migrants) seems to be 
strongly associated with the country of employment, which is an indicator of the geographic distance 
and wage differentials between Ukraine and this country. The share of migrants sending remittances is 
larger in long-distance-countries with higher earnings: e.g. Austria, Ireland, Denmark, Brazil, 100%; 
Israel, 88%; Spain, 81.8%; Italy, 78.6%; and Portugal, 71.3%. But it is significantly lower in 
                                                     
13 Due to suggested income brackets and two foreign currencies (Dollar and Euro) in the questionnaire of the Modular 
Migration Survey (see Chapter 2.1), the amounts of remittances per receiving household or per one sending migrant 
estimated by the the Ukrainian Center of Social Reforms are very rough. 
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neighbouring countries where labour migrants earn less and have higher incentives to return home: 
e.g. Czech Republic, 60.7%; Russia, 58.5%; Poland, 45.8%; and Hungary, 41.8%.14  
Furthermore, there is a significant difference between those who made one trip (58.4% of them sent 
remittances) or those who made several trips abroad (63.6%) and those who visited the destination 
country every month (30.1%) (Table A.4 in the Annex). This finding suggests that Ukrainians working 
close to their region of origin and frequently visiting their homes are more likely to bring part of their 
earnings physically rather than by sending money from abroad.15 At the same time, if they do send 
money they appear to send, on average, more than their counterparts. Each labour migrant that 
travelled to the host country every month sent on average US$ 3,471 in 2007 (UCSR, 2009, p.53). For 
comparison, labour migrants who reported one or several trips abroad sent, on average, respectively, 
US$ 2,353 and US$ 2,821. This difference may be explained by the commercial nature of labour 
mobility among frequent movers (UCSR, 2009). Alternatively, it may be explained by the higher costs 
of living and remitting by migrants moving less frequently between Ukraine and the country of 
employment; presumably many of these were long-term and illegal migrants. 
Long-term migrants (i.e. those who stayed abroad for at least 12 months during the last migration 
period) are found to have a higher propensity to remit (66.4%) than short-term migrants (about 60-
61%). This supports, of course, a strong correlation between the propensity to remit and the type of 
migration found above. Unfortunately, the design of the Modular Migration Survey does not allow an 
analysis of the remittance behaviour of Ukrainian labour migrants over longer periods of time and so 
hamstrings comparison with other countries.16 
Meanwhile, the legal status of migrants does not have a significant impact on their propensity to 
remit. The share of remittance senders among workers with residence and work permits is only 
slightly higher than among illegal workers: respectively 64.6% vs. 63.5% (Table A.4 in the Annex). 
But there are significant differences between such migrants in terms of the average amount remitted to 
their families: migrants with residence and work permits sent on average US$ 2,831 in 2007, whereas 
illegal migrants sent, in the same year, US$ 2,551 (UCSR, 2009). Authors of the report on 
international labour migration in Ukraine attribute this difference to differences in average monthly 
earnings (UCSR, 2009, p. 53). But given that, according to the Modular Migration Survey, average 
monthly earnings differed by US$ 35 in 2007  – US$ 867 for migrants with residence and work 
permits compared to US$ 832 for migrants without legal status – we would suggest another 
explanation: due to their illegal status migrants might incur higher costs for sending money home and 
so they remit less money. 
As Table A.4 in the Annex shows, a lower propensity to remit is associated with women and young 
unmarried individuals with basic or completed higher education whose families live in urban areas.17 
                                                     
14 According to the Modular Migration Survey, in 2007 the average monthly income of Ukrainians working in most popular 
destination countries was US$ 745 in Russia, US$ 1,120 in Italy, US$797 in the Czech Republic, US$ 635 in Poland, 
U$ 535 in Hungary, US$ 1,131 in Spain, and US$ 969 in Portugal (UCSR, 2009, p. 49).  
15 However, there are some exceptions to this rule, e.g. 36.5% of remittance-sending migrants in the US compared to 100% 
in Estonia and Latvia. 
16 For example, remittance senders among Latino immigrants in the US tend to be concentrated among more recently arrived 
immigrants, and the tendency to remit generally declines over time, even though migrants continue to remit money to 
their countries of origin after several decades (Agunias, 2006). In some other countries, propensity to remit shows a 
reverse U-shaped relationship with the duration of stay in the country of destination: it increases during the first years 
(usually five-ten years) but then declines steadily, especially if migrants are joined by dependants or marry and settle in 
the country of employment (Carling, 2005). 
17 According to the ETF Survey (ETF, 2008), gender and education are found to be non-significant determinants of the 
probability of sending remittances. Migrants working in sectors such as hotels and restaurants, domestic services and 
manufacturing were more likely to send remittances, while those involved in agriculture, trade or ICT were less likely to 
remit. Migrants from the EU countries were more likely to send money than migrants from North America and Russia. 
Approximately half of those respondents who sent money did so at least once a month. 
Olga Kupets 
22 CARIM-East RR2012/02 © 2012 EUI, RSCAS 
This finding is in line with our expectations and empirical comparative evidence from other transition 
economies suggesting that many such migrants intend to settle permanently in the host country and so 
they invest heavily in their new residence abroad. Alternatively, they have an interest in reaching a 
saving target in order to return home with a certain amount of money, e.g. to buy property or to start a 
business. Therefore, they need to minimize any “drains” on income, i.e. consumption expenses in the 
host country and the money remitted to the family (OECD, 2006). 
Ukrainian labour migrants use a wide array of formal and informal mechanisms to remit money, 
ranging from electronic transfers through banks, money transfer companies and postal offices to hand 
deliveries by the migrants themselves, friends/relatives or by a third party (couriers, bus drivers or 
train stewards). In the majority of cases (55.6%) labour migrants employ informal channels for 
sending remittances, but this trend is not uniform across all countries. 
Figure 7. Transfer channels for remittances in the major destination countries* 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on Modular Migration Survey individual-level data (with sample weights provided in the 
data set). 
Note: * Countries are ranked according to their share in the sample of remittance senders. Together they account for 91.1% of 
migrants who reported sending remittances. 
Figure 7 shows that formal channels dominate in Spain (68.2%), Italy (57.9%), Hungary (53.3%) 
and Portugal (51.2%), whereas informal channels are more frequently used in Russia (61.9%), the 
Czech Republic (67.1%), and Poland (79.3%). Moreover, the means of transfer differs radically within 
these two groups. For example, Italy stands out in terms of the use of couriers by remittance senders 
(15%). Migrants from Portugal, more often than migrants in the other countries, use transfers through 
money transfer operators (23%). Meanwhile, very similar migrants in Spain rely heavily on bank 
transfers (56%). Poland stands out with respect to hand deliveries by migrants themselves (49%). 
While Czech Republic and Portugal differ with respect to hand deliveries with help of friends or 
relatives (39%). Finally, Ukrainians working in Russia use postal transfers (5%) more often than 
migrants in other destinations. 
As expected, remittances received by household members were predominantly spent on basic 
consumption needs, i.e. purchase of food, clothes, basic services, etc.: 72% of respondents in the 
weighted sample of the Modular Migration Survey (Table 5). 39.3% of respondents reported spending 
remittances on the purchase of durable goods such as a car, a TV set, a computer, a washing machine, 
etc. 29.1% spent their remittances on the purchase, construction, reconstruction or repair of a house/ 
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flat. 12.4% spent on education (own or of household members). 10.4% spent remittances on the 
repayment of debt, 9.7% spent on savings, and 6.5% on payment for medical treatment. Finally, fewer 
than 1% of individuals reported investing money in agriculture (0.98%) or other ways of spending 
remittances (0.48%).18 
The results of the ETF survey on remittance spending patterns are generally in line with those 
found in the Modular Migration Survey. But in the latter survey the shares of migrants reporting 
spending on education, business activities, and savings are found to be significantly lower (Table 5). A 
comparison of the spending patterns of remittances and savings brought back by migrants according to 
the ETF survey reveals that migrants’ savings are predominantly spent on living expenses. However, 
savings are more often used for the purchase of durable goods, the purchase of real estate and business 
activities than is the case with remittances. 
Table 5. Use of remittances and savings brought back by returning migrants: Modular 
Migration Survey and ETF survey results (% of respondents who sent remittances/ saved 
money), 2007 
 Modular 
Migration 
Survey, 
Remittances 
ETF survey 
Remittances
(1) 
Migrants’ 
savings 
(2) 
Difference between 
(2) and (1) 
Essential consumption needs 72 73.4 58.3 -15.1 
Purchase of durable goods 39.3 25.8 39.5 13.7 
Purchase of real estate 29.1* 11.9 22.8 10.9 
Education 12.4 16.6 14.5 -2.1 
Repayment of debts 10.4 1 0.8 -0.2 
Savings 9.7 26.6 24.6 -2 
Medical treatment 6.5 – – – 
Business activity 1** 3.3 8.7 5.4 
Other 0.5 4.5 4.1 -0.4 
Rent  – 2.5 1.9 -0.6 
Housing repair n.a. 1.2 2.9 1.7 
No answer – 2.2 3.9 1.7 
% of migrants that reported 
sending remittances/ bringing 
savings 
61.1% 48% 90.4% – 
Source: UCSR (2009), Table 2.26; ETF (2008), Figure 31. 
Note: * Purchase of real estate includes the construction, the reconstruction or repair of a house/ flat. ** Business activity 
refers to investment in agriculture only as there is no other business activity in the Modular Migration Survey. 
If we compare remittance spending patterns from male and female migrants based on the Modular 
Migration Survey data (UCSR, 2009), men’s money is more likely to be spent on essential consumption 
needs (74% vs. 68% for women) and durable goods (42.1% vs. 33.4%). Remittances from women are 
more likely to be spent on education (14.8% vs. 11.2% for men), medical treatment (8.3% vs. 5.7%) and 
repayment of debt (11.3% vs. 9.9%), probably because women are more attentive to their children and 
aged parents than men. Rural residents spend more on real estate (35.9% vs. 22.3% for urban residents) 
and the repayment of debt (11.2% vs. 9.5), while urban residents are more likely to use remittances for 
education (13.9% vs. 10.8% for rural residents) and for health care (7.7% vs. 5.4%). 
                                                     
18 Unfortunately, there is no separate entry for “investment in business activity (apart from agriculture)” among suggested 
alternatives for spending remittances in the individual questionnaire of the Modular Migration Survey. 
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There are also significant differences in remittance use depending on the age of migrants (Figure 8). 
Older migrants (50-59 years) send remittances for everyday consumption and for the purchase of durable 
goods. But they also do so to improve housing conditions and to pay for medical treatment; medical 
treatment is particularly important for women. Whether they complement their inadequate pensions in 
such a way or help their dependants (children and parents) is an open question. 40-49 year-old migrants 
invest heavily in the education of their children, while younger migrants (15-24) are more likely to invest 
in their own education. Young migrants aged 25 to 29 more often use income earned abroad to save 
money and buy real estate, thus solving a burning problem for young families. At the same time, their 
relatively older counterparts (30-34 years) spend more on the purchase of durable goods.  
As we can see, most migrants from younger age groups tend to live in the present and they put 
aside the future in their intertemporal choices. They (or their households) predominantly spend 
remitted money on consumer goods satisfying current needs rather than thinking of future income and 
health needs. They work abroad for a long time, often they do not pay taxes, pension and social 
insurance payments in Ukraine, whereas their social contributions made abroad (if any) are not easily 
portable. They are, therefore, at risk of not having access to an old age pension and social protection 
after their return to Ukraine. Besides, by free-riding on local taxpayers they contribute to the under-
production of public goods and to the disruption of the welfare state in Ukraine. 
Figure 8. Use of remittances by age groups (%of respondents who sent remittances) 
0
20
40
60
80
15‐24  25‐29 30‐34 35‐39 40‐49 50‐59
consumption needs durable goods real estate
repayment of debt education medical treatment
savings
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Modular Migration Survey individual-level data (weighted with sample weights 
provided in the data set). 
Note: Real estate includes purchase, construction, reconstruction and repair of a house/ flat. 
Therefore, the earnings of Ukrainian labour migrants sent to household members are not 
extensively used for investment purposes and are not likely to boost entrepreneurship. But, whether 
from remittances or other sources, income is spent in a way which responds to the hierarchy of needs. 
It is certainly reasonable to assume that households will continue to exhibit the same spending patterns 
until a certain level of wealth is reached in the country (OECD, 2006). 
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Chapter III: Development Impact of Remittances in Ukraine 
3.1. Remittances as a source of foreign exchange19 
Ukraine has rich endowments, both in human and natural resources, and a favourable geographical 
location; being at the crossroads of major transportation routes from Europe to Asia and from the 
Scandinavian states to the Black Sea region. As a result, Ukraine is less dependent on remittances as a 
source of foreign exchange and income than smaller resource-poor CIS countries such as Moldova, the 
Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan (see Table 1 above). The scale and relative importance of workers’ 
remittances and the compensation of employees have increased markedly since 2007, partly for the 
statistical reasons explained above. But remittance flows do not exceed export earnings and private 
capital flows to the Ukrainian economy. On average remittances have equalled: 7.3% of total annual 
export earnings over the last 4 years; more than one-tenth of goods exported; about 72.5% of FDI 
inflows; and more than nine times official development assistance (Table 6). 
Table 6. Remittances to Ukraine in relation to GDP and selected balance  
of payments inflows, 1996-2010 
Year 
Remittances received as percentage of 
GDP ODA FDI Private capital flows 
Exports of goods, 
services and income 
Goods 
exports 
1996 0.01 1.5 1.2 0.8 0.03 0.04 
1997 0.02 4.5 1.9 0.5 0.06 0.08 
1998 0.03 2.6 1.6 1.5 0.07 0.09 
1999 0.06 3.2 3.6 4.5 0.10 0.14 
2000 0.11 6.1 5.5 4.5 0.17 0.21 
2001 0.4 27.5 17.8 19.5 0.7 0.8 
2002 0.5 44.0 30.2 20.2 0.9 1.1 
2003 0.7 100.5 23.2 14.5 1.1 1.4 
2004 0.6 112.3 24.0 10.9 1.0 1.2 
2005 0.7 144.5 7.6 5.8 1.3 1.7 
2006 0.8 171.5 14.8 8.9 1.6 2.1 
2007 3.2 1071.5 45.5 30.1 6.7 9.0 
2008 3.2 934.1 52.9 66.9 6.3 8.5 
2009 4.3 759.4 105.3 163.9 8.6 12.6 
2010 4.1 – 86.3 55.6 7.6 10.7 
Average 
1996-2006 1.2 241.7 28.1 27.2 2.4 3.3 
Average 
2007-2010 3.7 921.7 72.5 79.1 7.3 10.2 
Source: Author’s calculations, World Development Indicators (based on IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook 
and data files). 
Note: Remittances include workers' remittances, compensation of employees, and migrants' transfers. ODA refers to net 
official development assistance and official aid received. FDI refers to the net inflows of foreign investment (new investment 
inflows less disinvestment) to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in Ukrainian 
enterprises. Private capital flows consist of net foreign direct investment and portfolio investment. 
                                                     
19 In this chapter we use official remittance statistics despite its drawbacks discussed above. We assume that the data quality 
is consistently poor with similar biases over time, and focus our analysis on the relative changes in remittance inflows 
over time rather than on their absolute magnitude. 
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In addition to highlighting the scale of remittance flows in relation to other international flows, it is 
often argued, in the general literature on remittances and development, that remittances are 
conceptually distinct from official development flows and from purely profit-seeking private capital 
flows. As a result, it is also argued, that they are likely to act as a countercyclical mechanism and an 
informal “stabilization fund” (see, among many others, Agunias, 2006; Chami et al., 2008; and World 
Bank, 2006). Analysis of official statistics on remittance flows in Ukraine only partially supports this 
argument. Remittances denominated in US$ rose steadily until 2008. As the domestic economy and 
the economies of Russia and the EU – the major regional source for remittances into Ukraine – slipped 
into crisis they suffered a slight decline in 2009 (Figure 9). However, the decline in remittances and 
their volatility were smaller than those of private capital flows that increased during good economic 
times. But then they declined sharply in the wake of the economic and financial crisis in 2008-2009. 
Thus, remittances displayed a pro-cyclical relationship with domestic output, even though they reacted 
less violently to the economic downturn in 2009 than private capital flows. 
Figure 9. Volatility of remittances received compared to private capital flows, 1996-2010 
‐15
‐10
‐5
0
5
10
15
‐15000
‐10000
‐5000
0
5000
10000
15000
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
m
ln
. cu
rr
en
t U
S$
GDP growth (%, rhs) Private capital flows Remittances received 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (based on IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook and data files). 
Note: Remittances include workers' remittances, the compensation of employees, and migrants' transfers. Private capital 
flows consist of net foreign direct investment and portfolio investment. 
However, if we calculate the amount of remittance inflows in local currency using the average-
yearly official exchange rate (Table 7), remittance inflows show positive dynamics. There was an 
increase from UAH 30.6 bln. in 2008 to 39.7 bln. in 2009 and the numbers rose to 44.3 bln. in 2010. 
Consequently, the remitted income of migrant workers intended for consumption by recipient 
households can be seen not only as a relatively stable source of foreign exchange in Ukraine. They are 
also a regular source of household income that insures consumption against negative shocks in the 
home country. 
The Development and the Side Effects of Remittances in the CIS Countries: the Case of Ukraine  
CARIM-East RR2012/02 © 2012 EUI, RSCAS 27 
Table 7. Selected macro-economic indicators, 2005-2010 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Current account balance (mln. current US$) 2,531 -1,617 -5,272 -12,763 -1,732 -2,884 
Net trade in goods and services (mln. current US$) 671 -3,068 -8,152 -14,350 -1,953 -3,850 
Net trade in goods (mln. current US$) -1,135 -5,194 -10,572 -16,091 -4,307 -8,712 
Goods exports (mln. current US$) 35,024 38,949 49,840 67,717 40,394 52,191 
Goods imports (mln. current US$) 36,159 44,143 60,412 83,808 44,701 60,903 
Consumer price index (2005 = 100) 100 109.1 123.1 154.1 178.6 195.4 
Real effective exchange rate index (2005 = 100) 100 105 105.6 115.2 96.6 99.1 
Official exchange rate (UAH per US$) 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.3 7.8 7.9 
Household final consumption expenditure (mln. 
current US$) 47,732 64,269 84,887 80,777 76,843 – 
Gross capital formation (mln. current US$) 19,455 26,681 38,040 45,527 20,084 22,564 
Source: World Development Indicators. 
Increase in remittance inflows before the crisis helped narrow current account deficits that emerged 
in Ukraine with the worsening trade balance in 2005-2008 (Table 7). At the same time, there is no 
direct evidence of Dutch disease from remittances due to their relatively small scale, with the lion’s 
share devoted to imported goods (both fast moving and durable consumer goods). The observed 
appreciation of Ukraine’s real effective exchange rate in 2005-2008, that essentially returned to levels 
not seen since prior to the 1998 financial crisis, has been attributed to various factors. These included, 
above all, sharp wage and price increases that caused high inflation in the country relative to its 
trading partners and the erosion of price competitiveness, giving an almost unchanged nominal 
exchange rate which has been de facto pegged to the US$ since 2000 (IMF, 2008). Taking into 
account that our simple data analysis is very tentative, a more rigorous empirical approach is required 
for the assessment of the net effect of remittance inflows on the equilibrium real exchange rate. 
3.2. Remittances and growth 
Remittances may have a positive impact on growth through their positive effect on investment in 
physical capital, total factor productivity (via the facilitation of human capital formation), and the 
financial system of the recipient economy. But they may be counterbalanced by negative effects such 
as the appreciation of the real exchange rate (Dutch disease), the reduced labour effort of remittance-
receiving individuals (moral hazard), and the lost output and earnings missed out on by migrant 
workers abroad (the opportunity cost of emigration). As our previous analysis shows, remittances in 
Ukraine fund, above all, current consumption rather than the accumulation of physical capital. But 
they do not have a Dutch disease effect. Furthermore, remittances fuelling consumption and, therefore, 
domestic demand may also contribute to economic growth through multiplier and spill-over effects. 
This is particularly the case if they are spent on locally produced goods and services and if the market 
linkages between remittance-receiving regions and other areas of the country are relatively strong. 
Empirical evidence based on a partial equilibrium model confirms that remittance inflows 
contributed to pre-crisis GDP growth in Ukraine as well as in other CIS countries (see Chapter 1.2). 
However, the estimated impact of remittances on average GDP growth in 2001-2006 was less strong 
in Ukraine than in the smaller CIS economies which are more dependent on remittance inflows from 
their migrants. Macro-economic stabilization and structural reforms, recovery of output lost in the 
1990s, terms of trade gains and investment appear to be far more important factors than remittances 
(Iradian, 2007). 
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Given that remittances can affect output through indirect channels which are in most cases difficult 
to quantify, it would be interesting to look too at the findings of the study based on the computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) modelling. Atamanov et al. (2008) analyse income and distribution effects 
of migration and remittances in Ukraine and three smaller CIS economies, namely Moldova, Georgia, 
and the Kyrgyz Republic. Each country study uses a standard computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model with traditional neo-classical assumptions, which have been adapted to national circumstances. 
In this framework, five simulations have been carried out for Ukraine: the first simulation 
hypothetically reduces the recent strong growth in total factor productivity (TFP) by 10% (except in 
small-scale agriculture). The second and third simulations separately describe respectively the impact 
of a sharp reduction in remittances (by 70%) and an increase in domestic labour supply by 5% (if there 
is no labour migration). The fourth simulation combines lower remittances and larger labour supply. 
And the fifth simulation combines three effects: lower TFP, lower remittances and higher labour 
supply. Simulation results reveal that the pure effects of remittances (second simulation) are quite 
modest: private consumption declines by 5% from its base value, imports fall by 1.5% and exports 
increase by 2.9% (all in real terms), resulting in a decrease in real GDP, at market prices, of about 
0.2%. The food and light industries, the ICT sector and the public services would have contracted the 
most (from 1.3% to 3.5%) if remittances were reduced by 70%. While export-oriented industries, such 
as agriculture, the chemical industry and manufacturing would have grown by 0.5% to 3%. 
However, the authors emphasize the results of the fifth simulation which combines all direct and 
indirect effects of remittances. According to them, the 2004 hypothetical economy would have lost 
about 7.1% of its potential, private consumption, would have contracted by 18%, and all types of 
households would have lost from 14 to 21% in overall consumption without migration and remittance-
induced effects. 
Let’s now compare these results to those found in other CIS countries. As one might expect, 
hypothetical losses in terms of real GDP from reduction of remittances, migration and TFP in Moldova 
(10.9%), Georgia (13.3%) and the Kyrgyz Republic (13.8%) are much larger than in Ukraine (7.1%). 
Notwithstanding the usefulness of the estimated CGE models, they are inadequate when dealing 
with structural changes and causality as opposed to temporary deviations from equilibrium.20 
Moreover, the comparative-static model simulates the reactions of the economy at only one point in 
time (2004), and its final results are very sensitive to assumptions about the main input parameters: 
e.g. it is assumed for Ukraine that reduction of remittances by 70% is associated with an increase of 
5% in the labour force and a TFP reduction of 10%; while in Moldova, Georgia and the Kyrgyz 
Republic the figures stand at 20% each. Finally, the model’s complex structure with a large number of 
variables, input parameters, equations, adjustments and hidden assumptions made by the authors at 
their discretion is like a “black box” for any researchers who want to replicate results and do their own 
sensitivity analysis. 
3.3. Remittances, investment and financial development 
According to official statistics, Ukrainian households and, therefore, the Ukrainian economy annually 
receive remittances worth over US$ 5 bln. or 4-5% of GDP. However, this additional income is, as we 
have seen, predominantly spent on current consumption, durable goods and real estate (see Chapter 
2.4) and not on investment in business activities. This might be explained by unsatisfied consumption 
needs, small migrants’ earnings and transfers to invest in capital intensive businesses, lack of 
entrepreneurial ability and professional business skills, not to mention an unfavourable business and 
investment environment in Ukraine. 
                                                     
20 The author is grateful to S. Markowski for drawing her attention to the limitations of the CGE models. 
The Development and the Side Effects of Remittances in the CIS Countries: the Case of Ukraine  
CARIM-East RR2012/02 © 2012 EUI, RSCAS 29 
Even if households save some part of received income for a “rainy day” or to reach some saving 
target, the majority of them prefer “to keep cash under mattress” (often in foreign currency) rather 
than save money in bank accounts or to invest in securities.21 The major reason for this is generalised 
mistrust of the banking system and other financial intermediaries. This mistrust dates back to years of 
volatility in the 1990s and the recent crisis in the Ukrainian banking system induced by the failure of 
the country’s sixth largest bank, Prominvestbank, in October 2008 and by liquidity problems in many 
other financial institutions. A sharp depreciation of the hryvnia in fall 2008 and lost confidence in the 
banking system had certain negative effects. There was a mass withdrawal of money from savings 
accounts  (a bank run), especially those denominated in local currency (Figure 10), and further 
dollarization of household sector liabilities, from 38.8% in December 2007 to 49% in October 2011.  
As for the evolution of bank savings accounts held by households against remittance inflows, 
Figure 10 indicates that significant increases in remittances since 2007 have not resulted in an 
equivalent increase in amounts of money saved by households in bank accounts. However, a rapid 
increase in amounts deposited in Euros and Russian roubles, even during the economic crisis, may be 
a sign of more savings among remittance-recipient households.22  
Figure 10. Nominal growth rates of  savings from households (end-year stock)  
by currency type, 2003-Oct 2011 (%) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on the monetary statistics of the NBU on bank savings  accounts held by 
households in the depository corporations except for the NBU. 
Note: Growth rates are calculated from amounts of money saved by households in bank accounts at the end of 
period denominated in millions of hryvnias (UAH). 
                                                     
21 According to the survey supported by the USAID Capital Markets Project and Financial Sector Development Project 
conducted by GfK Ukraine in June 2010 (2007 Ukrainians aged 18 and over, from all regions of Ukraine and Kiev City): 
42% of the population makes its cash savings in UAH and 11% in foreign currency. Only 7% of Ukrainians currently 
have savings accounts at banks; and 8% of respondents plan to open such accounts in the near future. In general, only 
20% of Ukrainians consider bank deposits attractive, while 37% think investment in real estate is attractive. The 
attractiveness of securities (shares, corporate bonds and government bonds) is less than 1% (see 
http://www.finrep.kiev.ua/download/pensionsurvey_press_release_22jul10_en.pdf). 
22 The depreciation of the hryvnia in 2008-2009 was probably the major reason for increasing amounts of money saved in 
foreign currency-denominated accounts at the end of 2008 and 2009, as all accounts in the NBU statistics are measured in 
millions of current hryvnias. 
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In order to better describe the association between remittances and savingsaccounts, we examine 
here the statistics available from the NBU on household  savings by region and currency type at the 
end of 2008-2010 (Table 8). Our rough estimates for the four macro-regions defined in Chapter 2.4 
show that macro-regions, where a larger percentage of surveyed households receive remittances (West 
and South), tend to have higher household savings in relation to regional GDP and a higher share of 
foreign currency-denominated accounts in terms of total savings accounts. But they do not, typically, 
have higher savings per capita, mostly due to higher poverty rates and the lower saving rates of 
resident households compared to those living in more economically developed and richer regions in 
the Centre, North and East of Ukraine. Furthermore, macro-regions which are more dependent on 
remittances experienced a larger drop in household savings, particularly those denominated in the 
local currency between December 2008 and December 2009; and these same households lagged 
behind in the after-crisis resumption of savings (this particular trend is true only for Western oblasts). 
Table 8. Selected indicators of bank savings accounts from households by macro-regions* 
Indicator Year West South Centre, North, and Kiev City East 
Share of remittance-recipient households 
(%) 
2007-
2008 60 47 45 36 
End-year savings account amount per 
capita (UAH) 
2008 2,786 3,503 4,255 3,931 
2009 2,595 3,359 4,147 4,044 
2010 3,176 4,619 5,410 5,225 
End-year savings account amount as % 
of regional GDP  
2008 23.6 22.3 19.4 15.9 
2009 22.3 20.8 18.9 17.8 
Share of foreign currency-denominated 
savings accounts out of total savings 
accounts (%) 
2008 49.7 52.4 41.0 43.1 
2009 52.4 54.2 42.8 45.5 
2010 46.6 50.1 37.5 41.7 
Growth rate in household savings (%)      
Total Dec 2009 
to Dec 
2008 
-6.6 -4.9 -3.8 1.9 
Denominated in UAH -11.5 -8.9 -7.1 -2.4 
Denominated in foreign currency -1.5 -1.6 0.1 7.3 
Total Dec 2010 
to Dec 
2009 
22.6 36.8 32.0 32.4 
Denominated in UAH 37.7 49.4 44.7 43.2 
Denominated in foreign currency 9.2 26.2 15.4 20.8 
Source: Author’s calculations based on monetary statistics of the NBU on bank savings accounts held by 
households in the depository corporations except for the NBU. Data on regional GDP in 2008-2009 and end-year 
resident population in 2008-2010 are taken from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine. Share of remittance-recipient 
households is calculated on the basis of household-level data from the Modular Migration Survey. 
Note: *See note to Figure 6 for the definition of macro-regions. Kiev City is included in “Centre and North” because the 
NBU provides the only joint data for the Kiev oblast and Kiev City. All data presented in the table refer to simple averages of 
regional indicators. 
There are no reliable statistics on the exact amount of remittances devoted to savings in bank 
accounts. But there are signs that remittances are not effectively captured by the banking sector due to 
its inherent weaknesses and that they are not efficiently employed by the banks to fuel growth through 
lending support in the SME sector. Nevertheless, there is no denying that remittances have had a 
considerable impact on financial development in Ukraine, at least through induced financial literacy 
among remittance-receiving households that has increased households’ use of formal bank services for 
their transfers and other financial transactions and that, therefore, gave a strong impulse to the 
development of the formal financial system across the country. 
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3.4. Remittances and employment 
Anecdotal evidence from Ukraine suggests that remittances spent on basic needs (food, clothes, home 
appliances, personal services, etc.) and real estate give a strong impulse to economic activity and 
employment in such previously underdeveloped sectors as: retail trade, transport, personal services, 
construction, financial intermediation and insurance, real estate and legal activities, food industry, the 
manufacturing of furniture and construction materials. They, therefore, facilitate the restructuring of 
the economy in response to customers’ needs. As Table A.5 in the Annex shows, trade and repair, 
hotels and restaurants, financial intermediation, real estate and municipal and individual services 
sectors proved engines of employment growth in Ukraine in the 2000s, particularly before the 
economic crisis in 2008-2009. However, given increased real wages and public transfers and the credit 
boom in Ukraine during 2002-2008 – a credit boom which depended more on consumption growth 
than on remittances – it would be erroneous to attribute all the benefits of consumption-driven growth 
to remittances per se. 
Given the positive dynamics of aggregate employment that occurs simultaneously with significant 
population decline  – over 3 mln. people during 2000-2010 – in Ukraine, the hypothesis about the 
moral hazard problem and significant income effect of remittances that caused reduction in labor 
supply is not generally supported at macro level. Unfortunately, there is no necessary household-level 
data to test this hypothesis at the micro level by comparing the labor market behavior of individuals 
who receive remittances from abroad to those who do not. According to the findings of various 
qualitative studies presented in the mass media and also according to anecdotal cases, remittances do 
reduce the labour efforts of receiving individuals. But these are then seen in the form of 
underemployment and less productive employment rather than non-participation in the labour force. 
Moreover, migration and remittances change the behaviour of many poor households which try harder 
to send their members abroad rather than allowing them to find decent jobs at home. Likewise, they 
invest more resources in financing emigration rather than on education and training. 
3.5. Remittances and inflation 
Expansionary fiscal and incomes policies, high steel prices (which fuelled very strong growth in 
domestic demand), very rapid money and credit growth pushed the economy beyond its capacity. 
These factors, together with rising food and energy prices, lifted CPI inflation to over 20 percent in 
2008 (IMF, 2008; Kirchner et al., 2008). Remittances have not been mentioned by international 
experts as major determinants of high inflation in Ukraine in the 2000s. However, it is widely accepted 
that remittances have also played a decisive role in setting off an inflationary spiral through their effect 
on household consumption, especially in imported goods. 
Remittances have often been blamed by experts for their huge impact on the real estate market. But 
there is no empirical support for this argument due to the lack of reliable data on house prices in 
Ukraine. According to real estate market specialists, the main drivers of explosive growth in house 
prices in Ukraine between 2002 and the third quarter of 2008 were: rapid economic growth, a shortage 
in new housing construction, relaxed mortgage loan rules and property speculation based on interest 
rate differentials.23 This argument is also partly supported by the findings of Stepanyan et al. (2010). 
They suggest that real GDP and domestic banks’ borrowing from abroad, rather than remittances, are 
determinants of house prices in the capital city of Ukraine and some other FSU countries: the Baltic 
countries, Russia, and Kazakhstan. 
Here we have employed the available quarterly statistics on average house prices on the secondary 
market of the main cities in 26 regions. We have correlated these changes in house prices between the 
                                                     
23 See http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/Europe/Ukraine/Price-History. 
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first quarter of 2007 and the third quarter of 200824 to the share of remittance-receiving households 
among all households analyzed in the Modular Migration Survey. In doing so we provide some 
insights into the role played by remittances in the regional growth of house prices before the economic 
and financial crisis. As Figure 11 shows, house prices have on average grown faster in regions with 
larger shares of remittance-receiving households. But this effect is very tentative because of poor data 
quality on the share of receiving households and house prices and needs further investigation in 
multivariate regressions with better data. 
Figure 11. Change in average house prices vs. share of households receiving remittances: 
evidence from regional statistics in 2007-2008 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on the joint database of the Association of Realtors of Ukraine (change in average house 
prices) and the Modular Migration Survey of Ukraine (share of remittance-receiving households among all households 
analyzed in the survey). 
Note: Average house prices refers to the average price of one square meter on the secondary market of the main city in the 
region (in current US$). The share of households receiving remittances is calculated on the basis of the answers of 
households about transfers (in cash or in kind) from abroad, 2007-2008. The line represents the best linear approximation of 
the relationship between the two variables, as determined by an OLS regression model. 
There are also other concerns mentioned in the Ukrainian literature regarding heavy remittance 
investment in real estate. First, since remittances often lead to increased transactions in existing houses 
and land, without any increase in output, this expenditure increases the stock of wealth and the 
investment of the family. But they do not increase the wealth of the country. Second, the  expenditure 
of remittance-receiving households on the purchase or construction of new housing in depressed areas 
are often considered “dead capital” as migrants, particularly those who are young and able to work, are 
not planning to live there after their return. Third, migrants from rural areas tend to buy housing for 
their children in large cities that encourages the outflow of the young from rural areas (Malynovska, 
2011). This, in turn, may damage the human capital endowment and the subsequent development 
potential of these areas. It also exerts a strain on local governments, public services and infrastructure 
(including transport, housing, maintenance of law and order, education, health and various welfare 
provisions) in urban areas. 
                                                     
24 In the fourth quarter of 2008, house prices denominated in US$ declined sharply due to the crisis-induced credit crunch 
and depreciation of the local currency. 
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3.6. Remittances and human capital formation 
Another channel through which remittances are likely to have a positive impact on growth and 
development in Ukraine is via the facilitation of human-capital formation. This, of course, assumes 
that significant productivity spillovers result from the recipients’ improved education outcomes (if the 
acquired skills are not wasted later) and their improved health. 
Household surveys on migration issues have showed that expenditure on education (predominantly 
of children) are the fourth most popular way of spending remittances in Ukraine (see Table 5 above). 
Moreover, anecdotal evidence and sociological surveys show that the need to finance children’s 
education are among the major motives for labour migration, particularly for women. Unfortunately, 
these surveys lack the information necessary for a rigorous micro-level analysis of the direct impact of 
migration and remittances on the education and health outcomes of children left behind, as had been 
done in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. It is also impossible to analyze the scale and structure of 
expenditure on education among remittance-recipient households compared to households without 
private transfers from abroad. Furthermore, it is difficult to empirically measure the effects of 
remittances on human-capital formation which may occur over a very long period. Given this, we 
analyze the impact of remittances on human capital formation in Ukraine using secondary information 
and indirect evidence. 
For one, the number of minors living without one or two parents, who work abroad, was estimated 
by the Ministry of Family, Youth and Sports of Ukraine at about 200,000 in 2008 (IOM, 2010).25 
Empirical evidence in Central Asian countries and Moldova (see Chapter 1.5) suggests that 
remittances may have a negative impact on the schooling attendance of children left behind. However, 
this is not typically the case in Ukraine. According to the analysis of attendance rates for upper 
secondary school-age adolescents (by gender, urban/ rural divide, and wealth quintiles) based on the 
Demographic and Health Survey conducted in Ukraine in 2007, nearly all adolescents from the 
examined groups attended school and, for the most part, at a level appropriate for their age, i.e. upper 
secondary or higher education (UNESCO, 2011, pp. 47-48). The notable exceptions were boys from 
the poorest households, who were less likely to be in school and to study at the appropriate age level. 
This analysis and available UNESCO statistics on gross enrolment ratios in primary and secondary 
education (96.7% in 2010) reveal that Ukraine compares favourably to other countries in the region in 
this respect. There is certainly no official information that would support the idea that migration and 
remittances result in lower schooling attendance or school dropouts.26 
However, the impact of long-term absenteeism on the part of one of the parents, particularly 
mothers, is found to be negative with respect to school performance, social behaviour and the 
psychological health of those children left behind.27 For example, the IOM survey conducted in 
August 2009 in 24 secondary schools located in the two Western oblasts (Ternopil and Chervnisti) 
found that children left behind are often less motivated to learn. There is, therefore, a fall off in  
                                                     
25 For example, in Ternopil 25.5% of schoolchildren surveyed in September-October 2005 had one parent working abroad, 
and 4.8% had both parents abroad. In Chernivtsi oblast, the share of schoolchildren with at least one migrant parent 
increased from 8% in 2004 to 11% in 2008. But there were districts where this share climbed to 28%. Over half of such 
children lived without one or without both parents for over three years. 47% of them lived with one parent, whereas 43% 
lived with grandparents, about 4% – with older siblings, 5% – with other relatives, 0.5% – with parents’ friends or 
neighbors, and 0.2% of migrant’s children lived alone (Malynovska, 2011). 
26 According to a joint UNICEF-IRC survey of the attitudes of early school leavers in Ukraine conducted in 1999 (UNICEF-
IRC, 2000), there are three main categories of school leavers: “teenagers from low-income families solely motivated to 
earn money, lazy teenagers who do not want to do anything, and children from families with one or two alcoholic 
parents”, but the typical reasons for dropping out of school mentioned by the young persons concerned were problems 
with studies, teachers, and classmates and low motivation to pursue studies. 
27 According to the survey on migrants’ children conducted by La Strada and the Ukraine International Human Rights 
Women’s Centre in 2006, 13% of children left behind could not communicate with their migrant parents for 6-12 months, 
7% for 1-2 years, and 5% for over 2 years (IOM, 2010).  
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learning achievements, a decline in moral values and the dominance of material values due to 
remittances from migrant parents.28 This is matched with social behaviour deviations, with 
aggressiveness and with arrogant attitudes towards other children and teachers and unsociability, 
distrust, and anxiety disorder issues (IOM, 2010). The positive impact of parents’ long-term 
absenteeism is mainly reflected in increased independence, increased responsibility, and better self-
discipline. As regards the attitude of children to money and gifts sent by their migrant mothers, it 
appears to be rather mixed: though some children like the gifts received, others state that they would 
much prefer to have their mothers at home. 
Other studies on labour migration in Ukraine and its consequences emphasize that parents’ 
migration and remittances often lead to early contact with smoking, drugs, alcohol, gambling and 
criminality. According to official estimates, families in which at least one adult moved abroad for 
employment account for 12% of the 180,000 “problem” families registered by the state social services 
in Ukraine (Malynovska, 2011, p. 17). What is more, remittances are blamed for: their distorting effect 
on spending decisions; the motivations of children in post-secondary education; labour effort; and 
career advancement due to the inherent moral hazard problem (IDSS, 2010, pp. 358-360). Therefore, 
there are the social costs of migration and remittances not only for family members left behind, 
particularly school-age children, but also for the wider economy and, indeed, for society. And it is not 
clear yet whether these long-term costs are balanced against the short-term macro-economic benefits 
of remittances discussed in this chapter. 
Meanwhile, the same studies point to fewer social costs and more benefits for remittances with 
respect to human-capital formation and the development of the education system in Ukraine: at least, if 
the children left behind are not very young (15 years and over) and if their migrant parents invest in 
higher education. In particular, it is often argued that remittances induce a rapid growth in demand for 
higher education that facilitates the development of higher education in Ukraine in terms of the number 
of institutions and students, particularly in regions with high emigration (Malynovska, 2011, p. 12). 
However, regional statistics on higher education institutions in Ukraine supports these arguments 
only partially. Yes, macro-regions where a larger percentage of households receive remittances (West 
and South) tend to have higher shares of private institutions and students paying for their studies from 
private household funds compared to other macro-regions (if we leave aside the capital city, Kiev). 
But these trends are not very strong for higher education institutions of the third and fourth 
accreditation levels (Table 9). Furthermore, these macro-regions have witnessed, on average, larger 
growth rates in student numbers in higher education institutions per 10,000 citizens at the end of the 
1990s,29 but this was not true of the 2000s. This implies that remittances play an important role in 
spurring demand for higher education. But it seems that other factors were the driving forces in 
increasing enrolment rates in higher education in Ukraine before the economic crisis in 2008: namely 
the increasing economic and social benefits of higher education combined with growing household 
income and increasing public expenditures on education (ETF, 2009). Similarly, many other factors in 
addition to an increase in remittance inflows can explain the growing number of young Ukrainians 
going abroad to study.30 
                                                     
28 Having significant financial support from their migrant parents, children tend to believe that “money can buy everything” 
(IOM, 2010). 
29 For example, the number of students per 10,000 citizens increased between 2001/2000 and 1995/1996 by 59.2% in 
Ternopil oblast, and by 63.5% in Ivano-Frankivsk oblast. 
30 According to the UNESCO Global Education Digests (2006 and 2010, 2011), the number of mobile students at the tertiary 
level from Ukraine – those who study in foreign countries where they are not permanent residents – increased from 
25,188 persons in 2004 to 27,214 persons in 2008 and then to 32,882 persons in 2009. The top five destinations for such 
students are the Russian Federation (12,101 in 2009 vs. 6,841 in 2004), Germany (6,437 in 2009 vs. 7,618 in 2004), 
Poland (3,210 in 2009 vs. 1,809 in 2004), the US (1,688 in 2009 vs. 2,004 in 2004), and France (1,334 in 2009, not in the 
list of the top five in 2004). 
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Table 9. Selected indicators of higher education institutions (HEI) by macro-regions* 
Indicator Academic year West South Centre and North East
Kyiv 
City 
Number of HEI (I-IV levels 
of accreditation) Total number 
1995/1996 203 149 221 371 93 
2009/2010 181 119 168 280 113 
Students of HEI (I-IV levels 
of accreditation) per 10,000 
population  
Average number 1995/1996 237 256 206 343 793 
2009/2010 427 426 354 593 2121 
Average growth 
rate (%) 
2001/2000 to 1995/1996 36.1 41.7 33.4 24.5 47.2 
2005/2006 to 2000/2001 33.9 24.9 39.3 45.3 81.6 
2009/2010 to 2005/2006 -0.6 -4.0 -6.8 -3.0 0.1 
HEI (I-II accreditation levels) Share of private 
institutions 
2007/2008 19.2 17.8 13.8 9.2 38.0 
2010/2011 18.5 17.9 12.9 10.2 44.7 
Share of students 
with private 
financing 
2007/2008 49.0 49.7 46.3 43.9 52.3 
2010/2011 44.7 42.4 39.4 36.9 55.4 
HEI (III-IV accreditation 
levels) 
Share of private 
institutions 
2007/2008 39.1 24.2 22.3 26.0 44.1 
2010/2011 36.2 23.6 20.7 25.5 40.6 
Share of students 
with private 
financing 
2007/2008 63.6 63.3 63.9 65.3 67.8 
2010/2011 60.0 59.6 57.6 61.2 63.5 
Source: Author’s calculations based on education statistics of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine. 
Note: *See note to Figure 6 for definition of macro-regions. All data presented in the table refer to simple averages of 
regional indicators, as the beginning of the academic year (i.e. September). TEI of the first and second accreditation levels 
include technical schools and colleges which provide higher education with a degree of junior specialist and/or bachelor 
(ISCED 5B), whereas TEI of the third and fourth accreditation levels include universities, institutes, academies and 
conservatories, which provide higher education with a bachelor, specialist and/or master degree (ISCED 5A). 
The significant increase in the number of young people with higher education, partly due to 
remittances, is a generally positive trend contributing to skill development and human capital 
formation in the country. However, it also brings challenges that have still not been fully addressed in 
Ukraine. The most obvious of these problems are the sheer quantity of new graduates compared to the 
number of highly-skilled jobs being created in the economy, the heavy bias of students toward well-
liked professions in economics, social sciences, business, law, education and the services, and the low 
quality of higher education due to widespread corruption and obsolete curricula (ETF, 2009). This 
adversely affects youth employability, but also contributes to a substantial skills mismatch in the 
Ukrainian economy, with labour shortages for blue-collar skilled workers (e.g. welders, electricians, 
turners, mechanics, painters, salespersons) and technical professionals (such as engineers, 
technologists, IT specialists) and a massive oversupply of others, in particular economists, 
accountants, financial specialists, managers, and lawyers. 
Many students coming from remittance-recipient households have invested a great deal of their 
households’ resources in higher education. Higher education comes with the promise of upward 
mobility and a better life compared to parents who were/are working hard abroad to pay for their 
children’s education. However, the shortage of well-paid decent jobs in the local job market forces 
other outcomes. Many young people take jobs for which they are overqualified, often in the informal 
economy, withdraw from the labour market31 or look for any jobs abroad.32 This, in turn, can have a 
                                                     
31 The percentage of young people aged 20-24 years who are neither in employment nor in education and training (NEET) 
increased from 22.6% in 2008 to 28.8% in 2009 (Kupets, 2011). 
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long-lasting adverse effect on human-capital formation in Ukraine as it reduces the present stock of 
human capital through brain waste. It also negatively affects the future accumulation of human capital 
by reducing private incentives to invest in education. 
3.7. Remittances, poverty, inequality and social implications 
It is well recognized in Ukraine that remittances, as a perfectly targeted income source at the 
household level, contribute to family wealth and higher living standards. They thus provide financing 
for essential human needs and housing. They improve the access of household members to education, 
health care and other public goods.33 And they alleviate liquidity constraints. What is more, temporary 
labour migration and income earned abroad help risk-averse households to diversify their sources of 
income to achieve desirable income flows over a year and to mitigate risks specific to particular 
income streams. Such risks might include crop failure in the case of agricultural production on a 
narrow product base or the business failure of the family enterprise due to unexpected changes in 
small business taxation. 
At a macro level, remittances play an important role in reducing the incidence and severity of 
poverty in Ukraine. In particular, remittances as private transfers from abroad have been mentioned as 
one of the mechanisms that have contributed to the considerable reduction of absolute poverty in 
Ukraine since 2001. And migration has been interpreted in terms of household risk management 
behaviour since it provides alternative sources of income during periods of uncertainty (World Bank, 
2005). However, the recent World Bank’s report on poverty in Ukraine (World Bank, 2007a) points to 
real wage growth and an increase in public transfers (in particular, pension, childbirth assistance, 
housing subsidies, social assistance to poor families, etc.) instead of remittances as the main drivers of 
declining poverty since 2005. 
Here we should quote a recent study of poverty, inequality and remittances in Ukraine based on the 
Household Budget Survey data and some indirect estimates,34 Libanova (2011). This study found that 
private transfers played a role in the reduction of the share of households living below the national 
poverty line in Ukraine: statutory subsistence minimum which increases in nominal terms over the 
course of a year.35 However, as Table 10 shows, poverty decreased 2002-2008, not because of 
remittances so much as because of economic growth and increasing public transfers. Therefore, 
though private transfers, including remittance-related transfers, have been instrumental in reducing 
poverty they cannot replace the welfare state. Interestingly, poverty rates in Ternopil oblast declined 
much more slowly than in other regions: Ternopil is one of the least economically developed oblasts 
in Ukraine with high unemployment, low wages, high poverty and high labour emigration. This 
suggests that poverty was much more responsive to growth in more industrially developed regions 
than it was in the poor agricultural areas of the country. 
(Contd.)                                                                   
32 According to the sample survey of young persons aged 15-34 years conducted in 2010 (IDSS, 2010), 45.4% of respondents 
reported their intention to find temporary employment abroad if possible. Strikingly, 26% of respondents would take any 
job abroad regardless of their field of study and acquired profession. 
33 According to the World Bank’s report (2007b) the problems in public health and education in Ukraine, the increasing 
incidence of informal out-of-pocket payments in health and education generate significant barriers in access to these 
services, particularly for the poor, and this occurs despite the constitutional guarantee of free basic health care and basic 
education in public facilities. 
34 Indirect estimates are used to distinguish between private transfers from abroad and private transfers within Ukraine that 
cannot be directly retrieved from the Household Budget Survey data. So, the results of this analysis should be interpreted 
with caution. “Remittances” are used here as a synonym of “private (family) transfers”. 
35 For example, subsistence minimum increased from UAH 894 in the first quarter of 2011 to UAH 911 in the second and 
third quarters, to UAH 934 in October-November 2011, and to UAH 953 in December 2011. 
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Table 10. Impact of private transfers on absolute poverty in Ukraine (% of households living 
below the national poverty line), 2000-2010 
 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
Ukraine 
Without transfers 72.0 74.9 54.4 36.9 15.5 21.5 
With transfers 70.6 72.5 50.2 32.9 12.6 16.9 
Regions with high 
outflow of migrants 
Without transfers 75.6 80.8 60.7 39.1 17.9 23.8 
With transfers 73.8 78.1 55.9 34.3 14.7 18.8 
Ternopil oblast 
Without transfers 70.9 83.7 60.3 45.8 31.7 36.6 
With transfers 68.7 77.3 54.9 39.0 26.9 31.4 
Regions with high 
inflow of migrants 
Without transfers 59.9 62.5 41.4 25.3 7.2 13.0 
With transfers 57.4 59.5 38.8 20.8 4.8 10.5 
Crimean Autonomous 
Republic 
Without transfers 77.5 85.5 67.3 43.3 13.5 23.1 
With transfers 75.1 82.5 63.3 36.4 9.0 19.5 
Source: Libanova (2011). 
It has also been found that private transfers sharpen income inequality in Ukraine, being the fourth 
important determinant after wages, pensions and entrepreneurial income (Libanova, 2011). According 
to rough estimates, remittance-receiving households in the lowest income quartile of households stood 
at 59.9%, compared to 65.3% in the top quartile (Table 11). Private transfers accounted for 4.5% of 
household income in the lowest quartile, and 6% in the top one. These findings are in line with 
empirical evidence found in many other countries in the CIS region (see Chapter 1.6) in that 
remittance-related transfers benefit better-off households more than poorer ones. After all, better-off 
households are more likely to be able to send household member(s) abroad and to receive larger 
remitted incomes because of higher educational attainment and better access to information about jobs 
and living conditions in other countries. Besides, remittances themselves have an impact on household 
income and, therefore, can change a household’s relative position in the distribution of income. 
Table 11. Selected indicators for households receiving private transfers  
by income quartiles, 2010 
Indicator Region Income quartiles Average 
I II III IV 
Share of recipient 
households among 
all households, %  
Ukraine 59.9 63.1 63.5 65.3 63.2 
Regions with high outflow of migrants 61.6 67.4 69.7 70.4 67.5 
Ternopil oblast 50.7 55.6 63.9 78.9 60.6 
Regions with high inflow of migrants 57.6 57.3 58.6 60.3 59.0 
Crimean Autonomous Republic 66.6 60.6 59.8 43.6 57.3 
Share of received 
transfers in money 
household income, 
%  
Ukraine 4.4 4.3 4.8 6.0 5.1 
Regions with high outflow of migrants 5.0 5.1 5.6 9.1 6.5 
Ternopil oblast 7.4 5.6 7.3 16.4 9.6 
Regions with high inflow of migrants 4.9 3.5 4.3 5.0 4.7 
Crimean Autonomous Republic  6.2 4.3 3.4 3.7 4.1 
Source: Libanova (2011). 
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For households with private transfers, the inclusion of these transfers causes the Gini coefficient to 
rise from 27.3% to 29.3% for Ukraine as a whole, and from 25.5% to 26.8% in backward regions with 
high outflow of migrants (Table 12). At the same time, the inclusion of private transfers do not 
significantly alter high Gini coefficients established in more developed regions with more employment 
opportunities and with relatively high incomes: these regions attract workers from other regions of 
Ukraine and other countries. The uneven spatial distribution of “winners” and “losers” in terms of the 
transformation process in Ukraine and subsequent economic growth may be attributed to lasting 
differences between the territories in terms of: their factor endowment and productivity, the 
concentration of economic activity shaped by various agglomeration forces, the quality of local 
infrastructure, the policy environment, and regional incentives and subsidies. This, in turn, gives rise 
to differences in returns on education, skills, business investment and the access of households to asset 
transfers, through privatization of enterprises, housing and land. These differences are further reflected 
in the unequal distribution of household wealth and income, both between and within regions. 
Table 12. Gini coefficient for household income with and without private transfers, 2009 
 Gini coefficient (%) 
With private transfers Without private transfers 
Ukraine 29.3 27.3 
Regions with high outflow of migrants 26.8 25.5 
Regions with high inflow of migrants 34.9 34.4 
Other regions 28.9 26.2 
Source: Libanova (2011). 
By increasing wealth and income inequality, remittances not only strengthen economic asymmetry 
but also exacerbate local social stratification, creating a new division of households in (mostly rural) 
communities based on remittance-receiving status. This development may have a particularly 
damaging effect on the children of migrants as they tend to be rejected socially by their peers due to 
relative affluence (expensive cell phones, computers, watches, clothes, shoes, etc.) combined with 
aggressive and disruptive behaviour. And a lack of peer relationships among children affects not only 
the quality of their current lives, but also their future social and professional attainment. 
Migration and remittances have positive effects on family wealth and consumption, but their social 
costs for the relevant families (called ‘transnational’ in the literature) may outweigh, by far, its 
economic benefits (Tolstokorova, 2009). In particular, the long-term absence of family member(s) 
because of labour migration compensated by the regular transfers of money and gifts from abroad 
fosters consumerism among those who stay behind, erodes emotional ties, redistributes gender roles, 
changes important family functions (including reproduction, the socialization of children, financial 
management, division of home labour), and increases the risk of divorce. However, our rough 
estimates based on the Modular Migration Survey data do not support the argument for the negative 
impact of migration on the relations of migrants with their family members as 73.9% of respondents 
(in a weighted sample of return migrants) reported no changes in relations with family members.36 
Besides, it is necessary to remember that, yes, migration seems to adversely affect family relations in 
certain cases. But we must also recall that it is not obvious how these relations would have changed in 
the absence of targeted remittance inflows that cushion poor families against everyday home 
problems. The issue of whether the impact of remittances on the receiving family depends on their 
scale and regularity needs further investigation. 
                                                     
36 The share of migrants where relations with spouses were affected is 10.3%. The shares of respondents reporting deteriorating 
relations with children and with other relatives are almost equal (about 4%). The rest did not give a definite answer. 
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Chapter IV: Policy Implications 
4.1. Remittances, public moral hazard, and policy trap in Ukraine 
Ukraine is less dependent on remittance inflows than smaller CIS countries such as Moldova and 
Tajikistan, and, therefore, internal factors – e.g. extra income from economic activities in the shadow 
economy and generous social benefits that are poorly targeted – are likely to be more important than 
remittances in reducing the households’ incentives to hold the government accountable. Nevertheless, 
remittances, by acting as a financial buffer for migrants and their families, and thus offering social 
protection and welfare, also contribute to a public moral hazard problem as observed in other CIS 
countries. Fairly large remittance inflows in Ukraine provide government with an extra degree of 
fiscal and monetary freedom which is largely misused, with huge spending on non-productive 
consumption. This spending includes the maintenance of a large inefficient public sector, transfers to 
the loss-making Pension Fund and Naftogaz company, and indirect subsidies to selected industries and 
privileged private companies and on grandiose sport and social objects for Euro-2012, many of which 
are likely to become “white elephants”. Besides, remittances that allow households to “purchase” the 
public good rather than rely solely on the government to provide that good, seem to facilitate further 
development of the informalised welfare model in Ukraine. 
The government has failed to put in place the policies and institutions needed to allow product and 
factor markets to operate effectively, due largely to state capture by vested interests and widespread 
rent-seeking behaviour. As a result, structural constraints and policies have trapped the Ukrainian 
economy in a partial reform equilibrium (Dubrovskiy et al. 2007; Havrylyshyn, 2005). Under such 
conditions, remittance inflows along with growing household income from internal sources such as 
wages, entrepreneurial income and social transfers fuel domestic demand. Domestic demand 
contributes to short-term economic growth, but also to high inflation as happened before the 2008 
economic crisis. In the meantime, due to weaknesses in the domestic banking sector and limited 
investment opportunities for most Ukrainians remittances are not extensively used to finance highly-
productive industries and activities. Widespread corruption in public administration at the local and 
national levels, weak rule of law and a poor investment climate also contribute to the slow emergence 
of new private activities that must coexist with an over-large and dysfunctional government. 
This, in turn, limits business expansion and export diversification. But it also increases macro-
economic volatility and the dependence of the domestic economy on imports. Lack of decent jobs, 
particularly in less economically developed and less attractive for investment regions, poor quality of 
public goods and services and limited opportunities for influencing the formal institutions in the right 
direction through the “voice” option lead to disillusionment. Certainly, these factors encourage many 
Ukrainians to behave more opportunistically and to choose the “exit” options: participating 
extensively in the underground economy;37 removing themselves from the labour force (particularly 
with regular income source such as remittances); or migrating to other countries. Remittances and 
income from shadow activities lift most households up to an acceptable standard of living and partly 
compensate for the government’s failure to provide public goods and services. They reduce a 
household’s incentives to hold the government accountable and to call for  political and economic 
reforms.38 This completes a policy trap presented schematically below (Figure 12). 
                                                     
37 According to Schneider et al. (2010), Ukraine is, in terms of the size of the underground (shadow) economy, in the top ten 
in the world and in the top three in the sample of transition economies. The shadow economy increased from 51.7% of 
official GDP in 1999 to 58.1% in 2007. 
38 The regional composition of labour migrants in Ukraine and the inherent differences in their choice of destination 
countries, with the bulk going from pro-European regions located in the western and central part of Ukraine to Europe 
and from pro-Russian regions in the east and south-east of the country to Russia, means that labour migrants have limited 
influence. They are quite unlikely to significantly change the attitudes and voting behavior of their household members 
and other people in their home regions by remitting political changes from abroad. In the meantime, the effectiveness of 
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Figure 12. Migration, remittances and policy trap in Ukraine 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation, based on ideas of Moldova’s migration-led-growth “policy trap” presented in World Bank 
(2011). 
The resulting vicious cycle, dominated by state capture and disincentives for strategic private 
investment and employment generation, goes a long way to explaining why remittances in Ukraine 
have had a limited impact on key aspects of development, including investment, human capital 
formation, macro-economic stability, spatial inequality reduction, and political change. 
4.2. Policy recommendations 
The main challenge for policymakers is, first of all, to break up this policy trap and then to design 
policies which promote remittances and that harness their potential, while limiting or preventing any 
counterproductive side effects. The predominance of consumption in the end-uses of remittance 
inflows indicate that they are compensatory transfers as they compensate family members for bad 
economic conditions. Hence,  they compensate Ukraine’s economy for its poor performance. We are 
not talking here of GDP per capita growth but, rather, a wide array of indicators important for 
individuals including inflation, job creation, life quality, access to adequate shelter, public investment 
in infrastructure, education, and health, government effectiveness, hopefulness, environmental quality, 
etc. And it is reasonable to expect that an economic and social environment that encourages labour 
emigration also limits the development impact of remittances. Therefore, to maximise the positive 
effects of remittances the Ukrainian authorities should concentrate on sound macro-economic 
(Contd.)                                                                   
the old Ukrainian diaspora in defending Western values such as individual rights, property rights, independently 
functioning democratic institutions and the rule of law in Ukraine and in helping Ukrainians to transform their society 
from within seems to be marginal. This is perhaps particularly true after V. Yanukovych’s victory in the presidential 
elections in 2010: see http://ukrweekly.com/archive/pdf3/2010/The_Ukrainian_Weekly _2010-30.pdf. 
A fiscal-policy-driven 
consumption boom, reinforced by 
rapidly expanding household credit 
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services and social 
protection system 
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Limited financial 
intermediation 
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state capture; weak rule of law, widespread 
corruption and poor investment climate 
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management, institutional reform and economic development strategies involving the whole economy; 
strategies that can mobilize all resources in the service of development. Otherwise, Ukraine will 
continue to be burdened by: volatile macro-economic fundamentals; a narrow manufacturing and 
export base; widespread corruption; weak market-supporting institutions; poor infrastructure; limited 
employment and growth in the official economy; low life quality; and high emigration and high 
remittances (unless emigrants acquire permanent resident status in the host country) which remain 
confined within closely targeted groups. 
Effective policy-making needs to be based on sound evidence. Therefore, it is recommended that: 
 the data on remittances be improved, making them available to researchers, investors and 
other interested parties. Understanding the actual scale of remittances is essential for making 
optimal policy decisions; 
 short-term desk studies be superseded and greater investment is made in longitudinal and in-
depth research on various aspects of remittances, in particular: 
o their economic implications in regard to long-run economic growth, labour-market 
performance, spatial inequality, the tax liability of temporary migrants and their access to 
public-good provisions; 
o the opportunity cost of emigration and remittances, i.e. the possible earnings forgone by 
the migrant in Ukraine and the output loss to the economy as a whole and to the most 
affected and/or socially important sectors including education, science, health care, sports 
and culture; 
o the long-term social implications of remittances with respect to migrant workers, their 
families and local communities; 
o the net benefits of remittances for the Ukrainian economy taking into account the costs of 
migration-induced HIV/ AIDS and other social diseases brought to Ukraine from other 
countries as well as the general physical health deterioration of return migrants. 
Based on collected data, the following policy options should be considered: 
 the encouragement of remittance flows through formal channels by:  
o further reducing transactions costs; 
o easing the obstacles that keep migrants from transferring money through bank accounts or 
international money transfer operators, e.g. issuing temporary identity cards for illegal 
migrants, promoting financial literacy of both senders and receivers; 
o reforming the banking sector both in the host country and in Ukraine with the primary 
goal being restored confidence and banking habits among customers; 
o providing financial incentives, e.g. offering preferential exchange and interest rates. 
Under certain conditions, these measures may help channel remittances in the formal banking 
system, ease banks’ liquidity constraints and lessen the credit crunch impact for businesses. An 
increase in the proportion of remittances sent through formal channels will also improve official 
remittance statistics; 
 incentives for the productive investment of remittances and other income are introduced, for 
example: 
o leaving the existing system of simplified taxation for sole entrepreneurs without 
considerable changes, providing special business training courses, and offering 
preferential access to cheap premises, capital goods and raw materials for return migrants 
and household members to encourage them in setting up businesses in backward areas; 
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o designing reliable mechanisms and instruments which allow remittance-receiving 
households and return migrants to invest in the capital market without undue exposure to 
high risk; 
 engagement in active policy debates on reducing legal barriers to labour mobility between 
Ukraine and the EU countries is strengthened with coordinating efforts in effective migration 
management, including such important issues as undocumented (illegal) migration, cross-
border human trafficking, the mutual recognition of professional qualifications, skills 
matching between migrant workers and jobs abroad, and the portability of pensions, health, 
and other social benefits. 
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 ANNEX 
Table A.1 Potential benefits and costs of remittances for developing countries 
Potential Benefits Potential Costs 
Micro-level (households) 
R. improve households’ welfare, financing essential human needs, and, like social 
insurance, help smooth household consumption by responding positively to adverse 
shocks: e.g. flood, crop failure, job loss, etc. 
R. may encourage conspicuous consumption, with excessive expenditure on 
expensive goods and home appliances, and may sharpen social stratification, 
particularly among the young. 
R. may boost investment in education and health thus contributing to human capital 
formation and promoting the social basis for economic development. 
R. may create disincentives to school attendance and good performance in 
school among the children left behind, especially if the mother has migrated. 
Such children may also be less well socially adjusted. 
R. may ease liquidity constraints and raise household investment in entrepreneurial 
activities thus encouraging entrepreneurship and rural development (through the 
promotion of new small-scale enterprises in the non-farm sector). 
R. may enable remaining household members to reduce their labour effort 
(“moral hazard” problem at micro-level) that may adversely affect the aggregate 
labour supply, growth and development at macro-level. 
R. coupled with increased technology transfers from migrants abroad may also boost 
investment in innovative production activities. 
R. may also create incentives for other households to spend more efforts and 
resources on financing the future emigration of their household member(s) 
rather than on human-capital formation or entrepreneurial activity at home. 
R. facilitate the economic independence and empowerment of women at both ends of a 
remittance transaction. 
R. may have social externalities such as family disintegration and changing 
youth behaviours (an increase in drug and alcohol use, criminal activities and 
risky sexual behaviour) with negative development outcomes. 
R. may bring more openness and increased social mobility allowing household members 
more flexibility in their social roles. R. may have the effect of weakening social obligations and social cohesiveness. 
R. may strengthen democratic values and infuse new and progressive ideas through the 
closer interaction of remittance-receiving households with the transnational diasporas or 
returning migrants. 
R. may facilitate the decline of traditional cultural practices though the infusion 
of alien practices and values from abroad. 
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Table A.1 Potential benefits and costs of remittances for developing countries (cont.) 
Macro-level (economy and society) 
Remittances-induced domestic demand contributes to economic growth and 
development with multiplier effects and it facilitates the restructuring of the economy 
and employment. 
Remittance-fuelled expenditures may lead to increased prices in the sectors 
with higher investment among receiving households and therefore induce 
overall inflation. 
As a relatively stable source of foreign exchange R. contribute to the balance of 
payments and play an important role in maintaining the macro-economic stability of 
recipient countries which suffered a downturn in activity or macro-economic shocks. 
R. may cause an appreciation of the real exchange rate and therefore may 
undermine a country’s price competitiveness: the so-called “Dutch disease” 
which most often refers to the damaging effect of the exploitation and export of 
natural resources on an economy and takes its name from the crisis in the 
Netherlands in the 1960s. 
Remittances-driven conspicuous consumption of foreign goods may cause a 
psychological downgrading of domestic goods and a further increase in imports. 
R. tend to improve the sustainability of government debt (debt-to-GDP ratio) and to 
enhance the ability of debt to act as a shock absorber: if the presence of workers’ 
remittances in an economy makes government revenue and the time path of real GDP 
more stable. 
Increased dependence of the domestic economy on remittances may adversely 
impact its overall shock-resistance contributing to the “import” of the financial and 
economic crisis from abroad and increased domestic business cycle volatility. 
In countries with an underdeveloped domestic financial system R. help alleviate credit 
constraints and meet the capital needs of the private sector (mostly SMEs). 
Substituting bank loans provided through the formal financial system, R. may 
create an informal financial market and facilitate the expansion of the shadow 
economy. 
R. may also give a strong impulse to the development of the formal financial system of 
the home country and its integration with the international financial system. 
In extreme cases R. may support social movements and political groups that 
encourage or engage in conflicts. 
R. may improve the country's creditworthiness for external borrowing and expand its 
access to relatively cheap and long-term financing from the international capital 
markets via innovative financing tools such as Diaspora bonds and remittance-backed 
bonds (i.e. securitization of remittance flows). 
R. may reduce the government’s incentive to maintain fiscal policy discipline 
providing it with the fiscal space and allowing it to consume and borrow more. 
Thus R. may increase the exposure of the domestic economy to external 
shocks. 
R. may be an effective means to redistribute income and thus reduce income inequality 
and poverty. 
R. may sharpen income inequality in the case of the underrepresentation of the 
poor among migrants. 
R. may positively affect the politics of the home countries and democratic development 
if migrants and their households push for political and economic reforms. 
R. may pose a “public moral hazard” problem by reducing the political will to 
respond to the burning challenges in economic and political spheres and 
reducing too the will to implement necessary reforms. 
Source: Author’s compilation based on Agunias (2006), Chami et al. (2008), Ghosh (2006), OECD (2006), Rapoport and Docquer (2006), World Bank (2006) and own ideas.
49 CARIM-East RR2012/02 © 2012 EUI, RSCAS
The Development and the Side Effects of Remittances in the CIS Countries: the Case of Ukraine
 Table A.2 Remittances, income inequality measures in the CIS countries, 2001-2010  
Country Indicator Name 20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
Armenia GINI index 36.2 35.7 33.8 – – – – 30.9 – – 
Income share top 20% 44.2 44.0 42.8 – – – – 39.8 – – 
Income share bottom 20% 7.6 7.9 8.6 – – – – 8.8 – – 
Poverty headcount ratio (%) 48.3 – – – – – – 23.5 26.5 – 
Remittances (% of GDP) 4.5 5.5 6.0 12.1 10.2 10.3 9.2 9.1 9.0 10.7 
Azerbaija
n 
GINI index 36.5 – – – 16.8 – – 33.7 – – 
Income share top 20% 44.4 – – – 30.3 – – 42.1 – – 
Income share bottom 20% 7.5 – – – 13.3 – – 8.0 – – 
Poverty headcount ratio (%) 49.6 – – – – – – 15.8 – – 
Remittances (% of GDP) 1.8 2.9 2.3 2.6 5.2 3.9 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.8 
Belarus GINI index 30.7 29.7 – 26.2 27.9 – – 27.2 – – 
Income share top 20% 39.1 38.2 – 35.8 36.9 – – 36.4 – – 
Income share bottom 20% 8.2 8.5 – 9.4 8.8 – – 9.2 – – 
Poverty headcount ratio (%) 28.9 30.5 27.1 17.8 12.7 11.1 7.7 6.1 5.4 – 
Remittances (% of GDP) 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.1 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Georgia GINI index 36.9 40.3 40.4 – 40.8 – – 41.3 – – 
Income share top 20% 43.6 46.4 46.4 – 46.6 – – 47.2 – – 
Income share bottom 20% 6.4 5.6 5.5 – 5.4 – – 5.3 – – 
Poverty headcount ratio (%) – – – – – – 23.6 – – – 
Remittances (% of GDP) 5.6 6.8 5.9 5.9 5.4 6.3 6.8 5.7 6.6 6.9 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
GINI index – 31.7 – 32.9 – – 33.4 – – – 
Income share top 20% – 40.3 – 41.4 – – 42.8 – – – 
Income share bottom 20% – 8.4 – 8.1 – – 8.8 – – – 
Poverty headcount ratio (%) – – 49.9  43.1 – – – – – 
Remittances (% of GDP) 0.7 2.3 4.1 8.5 13.1 17.0 18.8 24.0 21.1 27.6 
Moldova GINI index 36.2 36.9 – 35.6 – – – 38.0 – – 
Income share top 20% 43.7 44.1 – 43.3 – – – 45.3 – – 
Income share bottom 20% 7.1 6.8 – 7.3 – – – 6.8 – – 
Poverty headcount ratio (%) 54.6 40.4 29.0 26.5 29.0 – – – – – 
Remittances (% of GDP) 16.4 19.5 24.6 27.1 30.8 34.7 34.0 31.3 22.3 23.6 
Tajikistan GINI index – – 32.6 33.6 – – – – – – 
Income share top 20% – – 40.9 41.7 – – – – – – 
Income share bottom 20% – – 7.9 7.8 – – – – – – 
Poverty headcount ratio (%) – – 72.4 – – – 53.1 – 47.2 – 
Remittances (% of GDP) – 6.4 9.4 12.1 20.2 36.0 45.5 49.3 35.1 40.0 
Ukraine GINI index – 28.3 – – 28.2 – – 27.5 – – 
Income share top 20% – 37.4 – – 37.4 – – 37.1 – – 
Income share bottom 20% – 8.9 – – 9.0 – – 9.4 – – 
Poverty headcount ratio (%) – – 18.8 14.0 7.9 – – – – – 
Remittances (% of GDP) 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.8 3.2 3.2 4.3 4.1 
Source: World Development Indicators. 
Notes: Income share top (bottom) 20% refers to the income share held by highest (lowest) 20% of population. Poverty head-
count ratio refers to the percentage of the population living below the national poverty line (based on World Bank's country 
poverty assessments and country Poverty Reduction Strategies). Remittances (% of GDP) are the sum of workers' 
remittances, compensation of employees, and migrants' transfers, received by the country and divided by the World Bank 
GDP estimates. 
CARIM-East RR2012/02 © 2012 EUI, RSCAS 50
Olga Kupets 
  
Table A.3 Personal remittance inflows to Ukraine by the main countries 
Countries 
Amount (mln. US$) Share of total, %  Year-on-year change, % 
2008 2009 2010 Jan-Sep 2010 
Jan-Sep 
2011 
Jan-Sep 
2011 2009 2010 
Jan-Sep 
2011 
TOTAL 5,372 4,657 5,085 3,671 4,447 100 -13.3 9.2 21.1 
CIS 1,873.5 1,297.6 1,668.2 1,174.4 1,477.1 33.2 -30.7 28.6 25.8 
Russia 1,833.2 1,254.8 1,619.1 1,138.9 1,429 32.1 -31.6 29.0 29.5 
Kazakhstan 40.3 42.8 49.1 35.5 48.1 1.1 6.2 14.7 35.9 
EU 2,155 1,909.6 2,032.9 1,474.9 1,696.7 38.2 -11.4 6.5 15.0 
Germany 316.5 336.3 381.7 279.2 308.3 6.9 6.3 13.5 10.5 
Greece 248.2 269 303.3 220.6 251.5 5.7 8.4 12.7 14.9 
Cyprus 218.7 208.6 242.1 174.1 249.4 5.6 -4.6 16.1 47.0 
Italy 340.1 274.2 281.9 204.4 248.9 5.6 -19.4 2.8 24.8 
UK 332.9 259.1 254.1 187.1 187.1 4.2 -22.2 -1.9 1.9 
Spain 214.9 152.7 146.5 109.1 105.6 2.4 -28.9 -4.0 -2.5 
Netherlands 69.3 64.1 75.3 53.7 67.4 1.5 -7.5 17.5 25.8 
Portugal 108 84.4 76.6 56.1 59.6 1.3 -21.9 -9.3 7.8 
Latvia 81.7 61 64.7 45.9 45.9 1.0 -25.3 6.0 8.6 
France 41.6 34 47.2 32.7 43.7 1.0 -18.3 38.8 43.5 
Belgium 43.3 41 40.2 28.8 33.7 0.8 -5.3 -1.8 22.8 
Poland 34 25.6 26.1 19.4 25.7 0.6 -24.7 2.0 42.7 
Czech 
Republic 30.2 28 27.5 19 25.5 0.6 -7.3 -1.8 70.5 
Denmark 35 36.8 35.1 26.8 22.6 0.5 5.1 -4.6 -13.5 
Austria 40.6 34.8 30.6 18 21.8 0.5 -14.3 -12.0 -17.3 
Rest of the 
world 1,222.1 1,190.1 1,295.6 951.9 1,031.5 23.2 -2.6 8.9 8.4 
US 620.1 545.2 577.9 422.2 460.1 10.3 -12.1 6.0 10.4 
Switzerland 149.7 138.9 162.3 121.9 99.1 2.2 -7.2 16.9 -21.0 
UAE 68.9 83.8 95.1 69.1 82 1.8 21.6 13.5 22.7 
Canada 88.2 109 107.3 81.6 81.7 1.8 23.6 -1.5 -6.9 
Israel 72.3 61.5 68.1 49.3 56.3 1.3 -14.9 10.8 15.4 
Turkey 52.3 48.6 52.4 38.1 47.4 1.1 -7.1 7.9 25.9 
Singapore 34 41.9 48.4 34.8 43.3 1.0 23.2 15.6 24.1 
China 35.8 34 40.3 30.4 37.8 0.9 -5.0 18.6 29.4 
Norway 27.8 38.2 46.5 33.6 37.8 0.9 37.4 21.6 7.7 
Hong Kong 31 39.3 41.4 30 35.6 0.8 26.8 5.2 15.7 
Monaco 19.6 27.6 27.6 19.7 31.2 0.7 40.8 0.0 60.6 
Panama 22.4 22.1 28.3 21.2 19.2 0.4 -1.3 28.1 -31.9 
Australia 26 21.9 24.2 18 18 0.4 -15.8 10.5 0.0 
Source: NBU, author’s calculations for country groups. 
Note: Data is based on bank statements on transactions with non-residents and the transfers performed using international 
money transfer systems, and they do not include the amounts received through informal channels and money transfer systems 
created by residents of Ukraine. 
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Table A.4 Composition of labour migrants by remittance behaviour and by various 
characteristics* 
Category Category item 
Share of migrants 
which sent 
remittances in each 
category item (%) 
Composition of migrants (% of total ) 
which: 
sent 
remittances 
did not send 
remittances total 
Country 
(10 most 
popular 
destinations) 
Russia 58.5 45.3 50.4 47.3 
Italy 78.6 19.0 8.1 14.8 
Czech Republic 60.7 11.8 12.0 11.9 
Poland 45.9 4.9 9.0 6.5 
Hungary 41.8 2.5 5.6 3.7 
Spain 81.7 4.2 1.5 3.2 
Portugal 71.4 3.3 2.1 2.9 
US 36.5 0.9 2.5 1.5 
Germany 28.7 0.6 2.3 1.3 
Belarus 31.5 0.5 1.7 0.9 
Frequency 
of trips 
One trip 58.4 32.7 36.7 34.3 
Several trips 63.6 66.3 59.6 63.7 
Monthly trips 30.1 1.0 3.7 2.1 
Duration of 
the last stay 
abroad 
Up to 1 month 60.8 10.8 11.1 10.9 
1-3 months 61.0 35.8 36.3 36.0 
3-6 months 59.4 16.0 17.4 16.6 
6-12 months 59.2 17.4 19.1 18.0 
Over12 months 66.4 20.0 16.1 18.5 
Legal status Residence and work permit 64.6 33.5 28.9 31.8 
Residence permit 63.0 3.5 3.2 3.4 
Temporary registration 56.5 36.3 43.9 39.3 
No legal status 63.5 24.1 21.8 23.2 
Gender Female 58.8 32.3 35.5 33.5 
Male 62.3 67.7 64.5 66.5 
Marital 
status 
Married 67.2 65.3 50.2 59.5 
Single 45.7 20.1 37.5 26.9 
Divorced/ separated 63.8 12.0 10.7 11.5 
Widow 72.5 2.3 1.4 1.9 
Age 15-24 50.5 12.3 19.0 14.9 
25-29 49.1 11.4 18.5 14.1 
30-34 51.8 12.4 18.2 14.7 
35-39 68.3 16.4 11.9 14.7 
40-49 68.7 33.4 23.9 29.7 
50-59 72.3 14.2 8.5 12.0 
Education Complete higher 53.9 11.9 16.0 13.5 
Basic higher 40.4 0.6 1.5 1.0 
Incomplete higher 58.6 15.6 17.4 16.3 
Complete general secondary 64.0 62.3 55.1 59.5 
Basic general secondary 57.6 8.6 10.0 9.1 
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Category Category item 
Share of migrants 
which sent 
remittances in each 
category item (%) 
Composition of migrants (% of total ) 
which: 
sent 
remittances 
did not send 
remittances total 
Place of 
household’s 
residence 
Urban area 56.7 50.0 60.0 53.9 
Rural area 66.3 50.0 40.0 46.1 
Macro-
region of 
household’s 
residence 
West 63.8 63.2 56.2 60.5 
East 61.0 16.8 16.8 16.8 
Centre and North 55.5 12.0 15.1 13.2 
South 49.9 6.7 10.6 8.2 
Kiev City 63.0 1.4 1.3 1.3 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Modular Migration Survey individual-level data (weighted with sample weights 
provided in the data set). 
Note: * According to the survey’s design, “labour migrants” refers here to individuals of working age (men 15-59 and women 
15-54) who had been abroad for employment at least once during 2007-June 2008 or who worked abroad at the time of 
interview. The table is based on the answers of such individuals (or their representatives) on the question: “Did you send 
money from abroad to other members of household?” and takes into account only non-missing entries. 
West includes Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi and Chernivtsi oblasts; East 
includes Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Luhansk and Kharkiv oblasts; Centre and North consists of Vinnytsia, 
Zhytomyr, Kiev, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkasy and Chernihiv oblasts; and South includes Crimean AR and 
Sevastopol, Mykolayiv, Odessa and Kherson oblasts 
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Table A.5 Employment changes by sectors, 2001-2010 
 
Annual employment growth rate (%) Net employment 
change between 
2000 and 2010, 
thousand people 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total employed -1.0 0.6 0.4 0.7 1.9 0.2 0.8 0.3 -3.7 0.4 91.0 
Agriculture -5.0 -0.3 -0.7 -2.6 0.2 -8.8 -4.6 -4.7 -5.1 -1.2 -1251.4 
Manufacturing and mining -4.5 -3.9 -2.3 -1.1 -0.1 -0.9 -1.6 -2.6 -8.4 -2.4 -1136.8 
Construction -4.2 -3.1 -0.6 8.9 3.7 4.8 4.4 1.3 -7.4 -2.4 39.4 
Trade and repair. Hotels and 
restaurants 9.6 6.9 2.6 5.8 5.1 5.5 3.6 3.9 -0.3 2.2 1710.7 
Transport and communication -2.1 2.1 0.6 1.0 1.9 2.0 1.7 1.0 -5.3 0.1 34.7 
Financial intermediation 3.5 3.5 6.9 13.6 14.7 15.4 20.4 14.7 -11.0 -5.3 166.7 
Real estate and other business 
activities 2.3 1.7 7.9 0.6 5.1 7.8 8.9 1.4 -0.1 0.4 337.3 
Public administration -3.0 1.8 -1.1 -10.3 -2.0 0.5 0.3 3.0 1.0 13.5 25.2 
Education 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.7 1.2 1.3 0.2 0.5 -0.2 -0.6 78.6 
Health and social work -1.3 -0.1 0.5 -1.3 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.8 -1.6 -0.5 -38.2 
Municipal and individual services 1.1 2.8 3.2 10.6 4.3 -0.5 2.4 0.9 -6.7 0.1 124.8 
Source: Author’s calculations based on employment statistics of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine. 
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